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Abstract 
This thesis work analyzes the value of information in two-action decision problems with 
different settings and provides upper and lower bounds on the value of perfect information. The 
research shows that if two decision makers accept the lottery without the information, then the 
more risk averse decision maker will value the perfect information higher than the less risk 
averse one. Conversely, if two decision makers reject the lottery without the information, then 
the less risk averse decision maker will value the perfect information higher than the more risk 
averse one. Finally, if a decision maker feels indifferent between accepting and rejecting the 
lottery without the information, then he/she will value the perfect information higher than any 
other decision maker with a more or less risk aversion. The work reveals that different measures 
of risk aversion are corresponding to the different assumptions on the dependent structure 
between the initial wealth and the lottery. This thesis exhibits how the different lotteries change 
the effects of risk aversion on the value of perfect information. Finally, the research extends 
these results to the imperfect information on sets under some assumptions.   
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Value of Information 
Value of information is rooted from the possible better decision with this 
information before action. Various definitions relating to the information value are 
applied in decision analysis and economics, such as utility indifference buying price, 
utility indifference selling price and expected utility increase (see La Valle 1968, 
Marschak and Radner 1972, Mock 1973, Gould 1974, Hilton 1981 for an extensive 
comparative analysis of these definitions). Formally, if a decision maker with some initial 
wealth, w, faces n possible decision alternatives, , 1,...,iX i n , and if he/she may make 
the decision after receiving information by observing a random signal, S , then the above 
three definitions on the value of information, VOI,  are given as follows. 
The utility indifference buying price is the cost at which the decision maker is 
indifferent between acquiring the information and acting without it. That is 
  
1,..., 1,...,
[max{ [ ( ) ]}] max{ ( )]}[i
i n i n
iE E U w X VOI S E U w X
 
    ,  
where E  is the expectation operator.  
The utility indifference selling price is the compensation which makes the 
decision maker feel indifferent between abandoning his/her access of the information and 
making decision with information. That is 
  
1,..., 1,...,
[max{ [ ( ) ]}] [max{ ( )]}
i n
i i
i n
E E U w X S E U w X VOI
 
    . 
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The increase in expected utility from observing the information in advance: 
  
1,..., 1,...,
[max{ [ ( ) ]}] max{ ( )][ }
i n i
i i
n
VOI E E U w X S E U w X
 
    . 
Once a decision maker obtains the extra information, he/she may share it with 
others instead of abandoning it in most decision problems. The analysis of utility 
indifferent selling price is due to a theoretical interest more than applications. Note that 
the utility indifferernt buying (or selling) price is defined implicitly. The increase in 
expected utility is much more convenient to measure than either of them. However, it is 
vulnerable in comparing the value of information for different decision makers, since the 
expected increases are based on different utility functions. We always use the utility 
indifference buying price of information as the value of information in this dissertation. 
1.2. Measures of risk aversion 
To describe the effects of some specific aspects of the decision situation on the 
value of information, it is not only a crucial theoretical interest in decision analysis but 
also one of its most active areas of application. For example, Blackwell (1953) showed 
that all decision makers value more accurate information higher than the less accurate 
information, which also indicates that the value of perfect information is an upper bound 
on the value of any information. The effects of risk aversion on value of information have 
been particularly concerned in decades (see for example Merkhofer 1977, Huang, 
Vertinsky and Ziemba 1977, Mehrez 1985, Nadiminti, Mukhopadhyay and Kriebel 1996, 
Delquie 2008, and Bickel 2008). 
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The classic definition of (absolute) risk aversion is defined by Arrow (1965) and 
Pratt (1964) as 
    
( )
( )
( )
U
U x
x
U x


 

, 
where U   and U  are the first and second order derivatives of U , respectively. 
Three different measures of risk aversion are widely used to describe the decision 
makers’ risk attitudes and to compare their preference for uncertain lotteries in different 
settings.  
Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) independently introduced the Arrow-Pratt measure 
of risk aversion. Formally, 
AU  is said to be more risk averse than BU  in the Arrow-Pratt 
sense if and only if ( ) ( ),BA x xx   , where ( )A x  and ( )B x  are the risk aversion 
functions of 
AU  and BU , respectively.  
Rubinstein (1973) introduced an alternative measure of risk aversion by 
comparing the Rubinstein’s risk aversion function, ( )UR W , which is the ratio of the 
expectation of the first two order of derivatives of the utility,U , over the final wealth, W , 
as 
   
[ ( )]
( )
[ ( )]
U
E U W
R W
E U W

 

,    (1.1) 
where the expectation is taken over the final wealth, W . 
Then AU is more risk averse than BU  in the Rubinstein’s sense if and only if 
   ( ) ( ),A BR R W WW   ,    (1.2) 
where ( )AR W and ( )BR W are the Rubinstein’s risk aversion of AU  and BU  over the final 
wealth W , respectively.  
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Since the final wealth may be either deterministic at a given level or uncertain, the 
Rubinstein’s measure of risk aversion is stronger than the Arrow-Pratt’s measure. It is 
also superior to the Arrow-Pratt’s measure when the decision maker’s portfolio consists 
of multiple lotteries (see Kihlstrom, Romer and Williams 1981, Pratt and Zeckhauser 
1987, Rubinstein 1973, Li and Ziemba 1989, 1993). 
Ross (1981) introduced an even stronger measure of risk aversion for risk averse 
utility functions. Machina and Neilson (1987) extended his results to the all utility 
functions and defined AU as being more risk averse than BU in the Ross’s sense, SA B   
if and only if  
   
( ) ( )
,
( )
,
( )B
A
A
BU x U x
U y
x y
U y
 


  

.    (1.3) 
The research on interpretation and generalization of risk aversion has been active 
for decades. (See Yaari 1969, Zeckhauser and Keeler 1970, Cass and Stiglitz 1972, 
Diamond and Stiglitz 1974, Kihlstrom and Mirman 1981, Szpiro 1986, Fu 1993, Kroll 
and Davidovitz 2003, Nielsen 2005, Jindapon and Neilson 2007, Martínez-Legaz and Quah 
2007, Delquie 2008) For example, Lars Nielsen (2005) derived that any decreasing 
absolute risk averse utility function has a decreasing absolute risk avesrse density. 
Delquie (2008) interpreted the risk tolerance coefficient, which is the inverse of the risk 
aversion of an expotential utility function, in terms of the maximum acceptable loss for 
any exponential decision makers. 
The relationship between the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion and the value 
of perfect information for the decision makers with deterministic initial wealth has had a 
large share of literature coverage. (See Howard 1966, 1967, Hilton 1981, Willinger 1989, 
Creane 1998, Eeckhoudt and Godfroid 2000) For example, Hilton (1981) posed an 
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example to show that there is no general monotonicity between risk aversion and the 
value of perfect information in the general sense. In related work, Willinger (1989) 
proved that the value of perfect information increases (or decreases) with the risk 
aversion for a decision maker with constant absolute risk aversion and lotteries with 
small variance depending on whether or not the variance of the optimal decision with the 
information is greater than the variance without the information. Eeckhoudt and Godfroid 
(2000) considered the value of perfect information in the newsboy problem and 
concluded that a risk averse decision maker values information higher than a risk neutral 
decision maker when the probability of the worst outcome is small (and the opposite 
relationship holds when this probability is large).  
The author considers the effects of risk aversion on the value of information in a 
two-action decision problem. The above three measures of risk aversion are used under 
different assumptions on the initial wealth, respectively. More precisely, if the decision 
makers have deterministic initial wealth, then the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion 
affects the value of information. However, if the initial wealth is uncertain, then the 
Rubinstein’s measure of risk aversion is applied for independent lotteries and the Ross’s 
measure is needed with even milder conditions on the initial wealth and the lottery. 
1.3. Two-Action Decision Problem 
The author analyzes the value of information for a decision maker, such as a 
venture capitalist, deciding on whether or not to embark on a new investment (or lottery).  
The decision maker follows the axioms of expected utility theory (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern 1947), and has a twice differentiable strictly increasing utility function ,  ,U  
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and initial wealth, w . Figure 1.1 shows the decision tree with two possible actions for 
this situation, where X  is the lottery.  
 
Figure 1.1. The decision tree for the two-action problem. 
The two-action decision problem described above has had a large share of 
literature coverage (see for example Schlaifer 1959, Raiffa and Schlaifer 1961, Pratt, 
Raiffa and Schlaifer 1995, and Mehrez 1985). In particular, Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961) 
discussed the value of perfect information on the outcome of X  for a risk neutral 
decision maker, while Mehrez (1985) provided an upper bound on the value of 
information for a risk averse decision maker with deterministic initial wealth.  
There has also been additional work characterizing the value of information in the 
two-action decision problem (see for example Merkhofer 1977, Huang, Vertinsky and 
Ziemba 1977, Nadiminti, Mukhopadhyay and Kriebel 1996, Keisler 2004, 2005, Delquie 
2008, and Bickel 2008). In particular, Keisler (2005) derived the condition for which the 
value of perfect information about two independent risks is super additive for a risk 
neutral decision maker in a two-action decision problem with normal priors. Bickel (2008) 
derived the ratio of the value of perfect information and the value of imperfect 
information for normally distributed payoffs and exponential decision makers in the two-
action problem. In related work, Delquie (2008) showed, in a very general setting, that 
the increment of expected utility from the information is greater when the intensity of the 
decision maker’s preference towards the different alternatives is lower.  
w
w XAccept
Reject
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1.4. Dissertation Contribution and Overview 
The author reveals the monotonicity between the value of information and the risk 
aversion in a two-action decision problem given the knowledge of the decision maker’s 
accept/reject decision without the information. More precisely, if two decision makers 
accept the lottery without the information, then the more risk averse decision maker 
values the information higher than the less risk averse decision maker. Conversely, if two 
decision makers reject the lottery without the information, than the less risk averse 
decision maker values the information higher than the more risk averse decision maker. 
Since the utility indifferent buying price of the lottery is monotonically decreasing with 
risk aversion, the more risk averse decision maker is more likely to reject the lottery than 
the less risk averse decision maker without the information. In particular, the decision 
maker who feels indifferent between accepting and rejecting the lottery without the 
information values the information highest among any more risk averse or less risk 
averse decision maker.  
Different measures of risk aversion are applied for different assumptions on initial 
wealth in the argument on the monotonicity between the risk aversion and the value of 
information in a two-action decision problem. Formally, if the initial wealth is 
deterministic, then the Arrow-Pratt measure is both necessary and sufficient. However, if 
the initial wealth is uncertain, then the author poses an example to show that the Arrow-
Pratt measure is not valid any longer. More precisely, if the initial wealth is uncertain but 
independent of the lottery, then the necessary and sufficient condition holds in the 
Rubinstein’s measure. However, if only the conditional expectation of the positive or 
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negative part of the lottery is independent of the uncertain initial wealth, then the Ross’s 
measure is the right one.  
The author also shows the effects of the lottery on such monotonicity when the 
initial wealth is deterministic. One natural problem is that if the more risk averse decision 
maker values the information on a lottery higher than the less risk averse decision maker, 
Does such monotonicity also hold for any better or worse lottery? The answer is depends 
on the risk attitude of the decision makers. Moreover, it may partially hold depending on 
the way in which two lotteries are compared with each other. 
All results mentioned above are based on the perfect information at first, but the 
author extends the conclusions to some imperfect information as well. More precisely, 
the imperfect information in this dissertation is from a particular partition of all possible 
outcomes of the lottery. The partition consists of some mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive intervals and the information indicates the exact interval in which 
the random outcome of the lottery will locate. The author proves that the same 
monotonicity between risk aversion and value of information holds with one extra 
condition on the risk aversion functions.  
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the 
effects of the risk aversion on the value of perfect information in a two-action decision 
problem when the initial wealth is deterministic. Chapter 3 continues the discussion for 
uncertain initial wealth. Chapter 4 reveals the effects of the lottery on the conclusions in 
the previous chapters. Chapter 5 shows the similar results for the information on intervals. 
The author concludes and offers some outlooks in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MONOTONICITY OF VALUE OF INFORMATION WITH 
DETERMINISTIC INITIAL WEALTH 
All utility functions in this chapter are strictly increasing and second order 
continuously differentiable. Suppose that a decision maker with a utility function, U , and 
deterministic initial wealth, w , is deciding on whether or not to purchase a risky lottery. 
The distribution of the lottery can be discrete or continuous. The information on the 
lottery is perfect. This chapter is organized as follows. We formulate the basic problem in 
section 2.1. We show the bounds on the value of information with or without the 
knowledge of the decision without the information in section 2.2. We prove the 
monotonicity between risk aversion and the value of information when two decision 
makers make the same accept/reject decision without the information in section 2.3. 
Section 2.4 presents the sensitivity analysis to risk aversion on the value of information. 
We summarize the main results in section 2.5. 
2.1. Problem Formulation 
We now formulate the value of information in a two-action decision problem 
where the initial wealth is deterministic. 
2.1.1. Indifferent Buying Price 
Let X  be the net profit of the lottery (its outcome minus its cost), and let 
( ( ), )b U x w X  be its utility indifference buying price, which can be obtained using the 
relation    
 10 
 
  [ ( ( ), ))]( ( )E w X b U x w X wU U    .   (2.1)
The sign of ( ( ), )b U x w X  determines whether the decision maker will accept the lottery 
without any additional information. To illustrate, if ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X  , then 
[ )](UE w X   ( )U w and the decision maker will purchase the risky lottery. Conversely, 
if ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X  , then ( )U w  [ )](E w XU   and the decision maker will not 
purchase the risky lottery. Finally, if ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X  , then [ )]( ( )UE w X U w   and 
the decision maker will be indifferent between purchasing and not purchasing the risky 
lottery.  
The indifference buying price defined in (2.1) exhibits an inverse relationship 
with the risk aversion function. More precisely, consider two decision makers A  and B  
with utility functions AU  and BU  , and deterministic initial wealth levels Aw  and Bw . To 
simplify the notations, we also denote A  and B  as the utility functions AU  and BU
wothout any confussion. Without loss of generality, we assume that A Bw w w , since 
we can modify the utility BU  to be 
ˆ ( ) ( )B B B AU x U x w w    by a simple translation on 
the axis. Let A and B  be the risk aversion functions of A  and B (respectively), and let 
( ( ), )Ab U x w X  and ( ( ), )Bb U x w X  be their indifference buying prices. The following 
Lemma, which will be useful in our development, formalizes this result.  
Lemma 2.1: Monotonicity of the indifference buying price with risk aversion 
 If ( ) ( ),A B xx x   , then ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ),A Bb U x w X b U x w XX   . 
Proof: Since B  is strictly increasing, we can uniquely define a strictly increasing 
concave function G  by ( ) ( ( ))A x G B x  (See Pratt 1964). Now we show the 
monotonicity of the indifference buying price with respect to the risk aversion in the 
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Arrow-Pratt sense by applying Jensen’s inequality to the concave function G . From the 
definition of the indifference buying price in (2.1), we have 
 
[ ( ( ), ))] ( ) ( ( ))
                                                 ( [ ( ( ), ))])
                                                 [ ( ( ( ), )))]
                  
(
(
(
E A w X b A x w X A w G B w
G E B w X b B x w X
E G B w X b B x w X
    
   
   
                               [ ( ( ), ))]( .E A w X b B x w X   
 
The inequality holds due to Jensen’s inequality on the concave function G . Since A  is 
increasing, we have ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )b A x w X b B x w X   .□ 
Lemma 2.1 implies that a more risk averse decision maker will have a lower net 
indifference buying price for the lottery than a less risk averse decision maker. 
Consequently, if a decision maker rejects the risky lottery, then any more risk averse 
decision maker will also reject it. Conversely, if a decision maker accepts the risky lottery, 
then any less risk averse decision maker will also accept it. 
2.1.2. Decomposition of Lottery 
Any lottery X  can be decomposed into two nonnegative parts, X

, and X  , 
with ,X X X    where X

 is the potential gain and X   is the potential loss such 
that  
  
     if 0,
0      if 0
X X
X
X 





 
   ,    
0        if 0,
     if 0.
X
X
X
X


 

 

 
Note that both X   and X

 are nonnegative random variables. Let ( )Xf x be the 
density function of X ; ( )
X
f x  be the density function of X

, and ( )
X
f x be the density 
function of X  . With this definition, ( )
X
f x  is identical to ( )Xf x  when 0x  , and has 
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an impulse at 0.x   The mass of this impulse is the probability that 0X  . Similarly, 
( )
X
f x  is identical to ( )Xf x  when 0x  , has an impulse at 0 of mass  equal to the 
probability that 0X  . Figure 2.1 plots these three density functions for a lottery, X , 
scaled Beta distributed on the interval [ $100,$100], with parameters, 24, 26r k  , i.e. 
(24,26, 100,100)X Beta  . 
 
Figure 2.1. Decomposition of the lottery X into two components. 
The expected value of the lottery X  is the difference between the mean of its 
potential gain and its potential loss, i.e. 
   [ ] [ ] [ ]E X E X E X   .    (2.2) 
Therefore, [ ] 0E X   if and only if [ ] [ ] 0E X E X   , and [ ] 0E X   if and 
only if [ ]E X   [ ] 0E X   . 
0
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
-100 -50 0 50 100
0
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
-100 -50 0 50 100
0
0.001
0.002
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0.004
0.005
0.006
-100 -50 0 50 100
X
X
X
{ 0}P X
{ 0}P X
( )
X
f x
( )
X
f x
( )Xf x
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2.1.3. Definitions of the Value of Information 
Let S be an indicator of X which can be obtained before the decision with cost c  
as  
    
1      if 0
0      i
)
 
0
f ,
(
0
X
S I X
X



 
  
where I  is an indicator function.  
Note that the signal S is all that is needed to determine whether the decision 
maker should accept or reject the investment and so it provides the equivalent of the 
value of perfect information for this decision. The decision maker will accept the 
investment if he observes that 1,S   and will reject it if 0S  . We always discuss this 
perfect information except for Chapter 5. 
 
Figure 2.2. The decision tree with the information signal S: (a) Accept the lottery without 
the information when ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X  ; (b) Reject the lottery without the information 
when ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X  . 
Figure 2.2 shows the decision tree with this information S on the outcome of X . 
If the decision maker acts without acquiring this information, then he/she should accept 
the investment if ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X  and reject it if ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X  . The expected 
utility of the optimal decision alternative without acquiring the information is  
  Acquire 
information
Act without
information
1S
0S
w c
w X cAccept
Reject
( 0)X
( 0)X
w
w X
Accept
Reject
w c
w X c
Accept
Reject
( )a
  Acquire 
information
Act without
information
1S
0S
w c
w X c
Accept
Reject
( 0)X
( 0)X
w
w XAccept
Reject
w c
w X c
Accept
Reject
( )b
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    max ( ),  ( )][U w E U w X .    (2.3)  
From figure 2.2, the expected utility after obtaining the information is 
[ ( ) ( 1)] [ ( ) ( 0)] [ ( )]E U w X I S E U w I S U wc c E cX         . (2.4) 
Note that the expectation on the right hand side of (2.4) is taken over the density ( ).
X
f x  
From (2.3) and (2.4), the value of the information on the signal, S  , which we denote as 
,VOI  satisfies 
  max{ ([ ( )] ),  ( )]}.[VOI U w wE w E XU UX       (2.5) 
We consider three cases: 
iii. If ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X  , then the decision maker is indifferent between 
accepting and rejecting the lottery without the information, Then
( ][ ( )[)]U w E UE w X  and VOI VOIA VOIR  is defined by either (2.6) or 
(2.7). 
2.2. Bounds on the Value of Information 
We now review the existing bounds on the value of information for decision 
makers with different risk attitudes facing this two-action problem, and propose new 
bounds given knowledge of the accept/reject decision without the information.  
 
i. If ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X  , then the decision maker accepts the lottery without the 
information.  In this case,  ( ) ( )][U w E U w X  and we write VOI VOIA , 
which is given by   
   ([ ( )] [ )]VOIAE U Uw X E w X    .  (2.6) 
ii. If ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X  , then the decision maker rejects the lottery without the 
information. In this case, ( ][ ( )[)]U w E UE w X  and we write VOI VOIR , 
which is given by  
   ) )[ (( ]VOI wE U R Uw X    .   (2.7) 
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Theorem 2.1: Bounds on the value of information 
The value of information on the outcome of lottery X , VOI , has the following bounds: 
To prove Theorem 2.1, we need the following two lemmas. 
Lemma 2.2: If G is concave and if B is monotonically increasing, then 
[ ( ( )) ( 0)] [ ( ( )) ( 0)]
( ( )){ [ ( ) ( 0)] [ ( ) ( 0)]},
E G B w X I X E G B w X c I X
G B w c E B w X I X E B w X c I X


       
         
 (2.8) 
where c is a positive constant. 
Proof: It is known that the graph of a concave function G  is always below its any 
tangent line. I.e.  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ,( ) ),
y y
x x
G y G x G t dt G x dt G x y x x y        .  (2.9) 
Let ( )B w cx X    and ( )B wy X   in (2.9),  
 
( ( )) ( ( ))
( ( ))[ ( ) ( )].
G B w X G B w X c
G B w X c B w X B w X c
 
  
   
      
   (2.10) 
Since 0X    and B is increasing, ( ) ( )B w X c B w c    . Since G is concave,
( ( )) ( ( ))G B w X c G B w c     .  Since 0c  , ( )B w X   ( )B w X c   and 
 
( ( ))[ ( ) ( )]
( ( ))[ ( ) ( )].
G B w X c B w X B w X c
G B w c B w X B w X c
  
 
      
     
   (2.11) 
From (2.10) and(2.11), we know that 
 
( ( )) ( ( ))
( ( ))[ ( ) ( )].
G B w X G B w X c
G B w c B w X B w X c
 
 
   
     
   (2.12) 
(i) For a risk neutral decision maker, [0 mi ][n{ ] }, .X E XVOI E     
(ii) For a risk averse decision maker, [0 ].VOI E X    
(iii) For a risk seeking decision maker, 0 ][VOI XE   . 
 16 
 
Taking the expectation of X over its positive part in (2.12), we have  
 
[ ( ( )) ( 0)] [ ( ( )) ( 0)]
[ ( ( )) ( 0)] [ ( ( )) ( 0)]
( ( )){ [ ( ) ( 0)] [ ( ) ( 0)]}
( ( )){ [ ( ) ( 0)] [ ( ) ( 0)]}.
E G B w X I X E G B w X c I X
E G B w X I X E G B w X c I X
G B w c E B w X I X E B w X c I X
G B w c E B w X I X E B w X c I X

 
 

       
        
         
         
 (2.13)  
The equalities in (2.13) are due to the fact that X X  when 0X  . □ 
Lemma 2.3: If G is concave and if B is monotonically increasing, then 
 
[ ( ( ))] [ ( ( ))]
( ( )){ [ ( )] [ ( )]},
E G B w X E G B w X c
G B w c E B w X E B w X c


   
     
   (2.14) 
where c is a positive constant. 
Proof: Since G is concave, we take ( )x B w c   and ( )B wy X   in (2.9) and 
obtain 
( ) (( ) ( ) ( )( ).) ( ) ( ) ( )B w X B w c B w c B w X B wG cG G         (2.15) 
Taking the expectation of X over its non-positive part in (2.15), we have  
    
[ ( ( )) ( 0)] [ ( ( )) ( 0)]
[ ( ( )) ( 0)] [ ( ( )) ( 0)]
( ( )){ [ ( ) ( 0) [ ( ) ( 0)]}
( ( )){ [ ( ) ( 0)] [ ( ) ( 0)]}.
E G B w X I X E G B w c I X
E G B w X I X E G B w c I X
G B w c E B w X I X E B w c I X
G B w c E B w X I X E B w X c I X




      
       
        
         
 (2.16) 
The equalities in (2.16) are due to the fact that X X    and 0X    when 0X  . 
From Lemma 2.2, we know 
    
[ ( ( )) ( 0)] [ ( ( )) ( 0)]
( ( )){ [ ( ) ( 0)] [ ( ) ( 0)]}.
E G B w X I X E G B w X c I X
G B w c E B w X I X E B w X c I X


       
         
 (2.17) 
We obtain (2.14) by adding  (2.16) and (2.17).     □  
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Now we start to prove theorem 2.1. 
Proof of Theorem 2.1: 
Part (i): See Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961, p 95-97). 
Part (ii): See Mehrez (1985). 
 Part (iii): Since G  is concave and strictly increasing, and we can apply Lemma 
 2.3 with B U , 1G U   and c VOI , where 1U  is the inverse function of U , and 
obtain  
( ( )){ [ ( )] [ ( )]}
[ ] [ ] [ ] .
G U w VOI E U w X E U w X VOI
E w X E w X VOI E X VOI

 
     
      
  (2.18) 
From the definition of value of information in (2.5), we know that  
[ ( )] max{ [ ( )], [ ( )]} [ ( )].E U w X VOI E U w E U w X E U w X       (2.19) 
Since G is strictly increasing, ( ( )) 0G U w VOI   and  
( ( )){ [ ( )] [ ( )]} 0.G U w VOI E U w X E U w X VOI          (2.20) 
Substituting from (2.20) into (2.18), gives [ ]VOI E X  .    □ 
Theorem 2.1 characterizes simple bounds on the value of the perfect information. 
Part (i) is a classic result for the two-action problem (see Raiffa and Schlaifer 1961), and 
Part (ii) is the bound provided by Mehrez (1985) for risk aversion decision makers. Part 
(iii) is new. We find it useful to include the result for a risk seeking decision maker, as it 
illustrates the main symmetry between ][E X   and ][E X  , and it will also be useful for 
future results. We now refine these bounds by knowledge of the decision made without 
the information.  
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Theorem 2.2: Refining the Bounds Given the Decision without the Information  
(i)   If a risk averse decision maker accepts the lottery X without the information, 
then [ [] ] 0EE X X   
 
and [ [] ].VOI XAX EE     
(ii)  If a risk seeking decision maker rejects the lottery X without the information, 
then [ [] ] 0EE X X  
 
and [ [] ].VOI XRX EE     
Proof: (i):  If ][ [ ]E XEX   , then ][ 0E X  and any risk averse decision maker 
will reject the lottery X without the information. Therefore, ][ [ ]E XEX   . Applying 
Lemma 2.3 with ( )B x x , ( ) ( )G x U x and [ ]c E X  , we have 
  
]
] ]
[ ( )] [ ( [ )]
( [ ){ [ ] [ [ } .] 0
E U w X E U w X E X
U w E X E w X E w X E X
 
  
   
      
 (2.21) 
From the definition of value of information in (2.6), we know that  
[ ( )] [ ( )].E U w X VOIA E U w X       (2.22) 
Comparing (2.21) with (2.22), we obtain that ][ ( [ )] [ (E U w X E X E U w X      
)]VOIA . Since U is increasing, [ ]VOIA E X
 . On the other hand, [ ]VOI E X  for any 
risk averse decision maker regardless of his/her decision without the information from 
Theorem 2.1 part (ii). Therefore, [ [] ].VOI XAX EE     
(ii):  If ][ [ ]E XEX   , then ][ 0E X  and any risk seeking decision maker will 
accept the lottery X without the information. Therefore, ][ [ ]E XEX   . From Jensen’s 
inequality for the convex functionU , we have 
[ ( [ ])] ( [ [ ]])
                                    ( ) [ ( )].
E U w X E X U E w X E X
U w E U w X VOIR
  

    
   
  (2.23) 
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Since U is increasing, [ ]VOIR E X  . On the other hand, [ ]VOI E X  for any 
risk seeking decision maker regardless of his/her decision without the information from 
Theorem 2.1 part (iii). Therefore, ][ ][VOIR EE X X    .    □ 
Knowledge of the accept/reject decision provides additional lower bounds on the 
information value. We offer some examples showing these refined bounds in sections 2.3 
and 2.4.  
2.3. Monotonicity of Value of Information for Different Decisions without the 
Information  
We now discuss monotonicity of value of information with risk aversion. Again 
consider the previous decision makers A  and B . Let A and B  be their risk aversion 
functions and let AVOI and BVOI  be the value of information for A  and B  (respectively).  
2.3.1. Accepting the Lottery without the Information 
If a decision maker accepts a lottery X without the information, then the value of 
information,VOI VOIA , and satisfies  
  ([ ( )] [ )]VOIA U wU w X E XE     .   (2.24) 
Moreover, since X XX    , the value of information can also be defined as 
  () )][ ( ] [VOIE U w X X EA U w X    .       (2.25) 
Comparing this expression to the definition of indifferent buying price in (2.1), 
we know that the value of information is equivalent to the indifferent buying price of the 
potential loss, X  , after accepting the lottery in this case. Therefore, we have the 
following Theorem.  
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Theorem 2.3: If two decision makers A  and B  both accept a lottery X without any 
further information, then the following two statements are equivalent: 
where 
AVOIA  and BVOIA are the value of information for A and B when they accept the 
lottery X without the information (respectively).  
Proof: To simplify the notation, we denote
 A
a and Ba  as A
VOIA and BVOIA . 
(i)  (ii) We prove it using Lemma 2.3. Apply Lemma 2.3 with Bc a , we have 
  
[ ( )] [ ( )]
[ ( ( ))] [ ( ( ))]
( ( )){ [ ( )] [ ( )]} 0.
A B
B
BB
E A w X a E A w X a
E G B w X E G B w X a
G B w a E B w X E B w X a
 


    
    
      
 (2.26) 
The equalities in (2.26) are due to the definition of value of information in (2.24). 
Since A  is increasing, A Ba a , i.e. A BVOIA VOIA . 
(ii)  (i) We want to show that if decision maker A values the information on all 
lotteries higher than decision maker B when they both accept them, then decision maker 
A is more risk averse than decision maker B. If decision maker A values the information 
on all lotteries higher than decision maker B when they both accept them, then decision 
maker A values the information on a particular lottery with sufficiently small risk higher 
than decision maker B when they both accept it. So we shall show that if decision maker 
A values the information on a particular lottery with sufficiently small risk higher than 
decision maker B when they both accept the lottery, then decision maker A is more risk 
averse than decision maker B. The value of information on such lottery is primarily 
determined by its lower order terms in the Taylor’s expansion on its risk. The higher 
(i)  ( x ) ( ) ( )A Bx x  ; 
(ii)  ( ,w X ) A BVOIA VOIA , 
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value of information on such lottery exhibits higher primary terms (the first and second 
terms) than the lower one. We prove that (ii) implies (i) by comparing the Taylor’s 
expansion of the value of information on such lottery for the two decision makers.  
For some given deterministic initial wealth, w , we consider the lottery X  with 
some small risk 0  as following, 
 
Figure 2.3. Binary lottery with small risk. 
If p is sufficiently close to 1, both decision makers will accept such lottery 
without the information. The definition of the value of information implies  
 
[ ( )] ( ) (1 ) ( )
                               [ ( )]
                               ( ) (1 ) ( ).
A AAE A w X a pA w p A w
E A w X
pA w p A w
a a     
 

 
   
 
The derivative of Aa with respect to  is 
 
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
( ) (1 ) ( )
A
A A
Ada pA w pA w p A wa
a ad pA w p A w
       

   

,  (2.27) 
and 0Aa  when 0 . Therefore, its value at 0  is 
 
0
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
1 .
( ) (1 ) ( )
Ada pA w pA w p A w p
d pA w p A w
    
  
  
   (2.28) 
The second derivative of Aa with respect to  is  
1 p
p
X
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2
2
2
( )(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
( ) (1 ) ( )
[ ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )]
         
( ( ) (1 ) ( ))
          [ ( )(1 ) (1 ) ( ) ],
A A
A A
A
A A
A A A A
A a
a a
a
a a
a a
d a pA w a pA w p A w
d pA w p A w
pA w pA w p A w
pA w p A w
pA w a p A w a
         

   
       

   
      





 
   
where AA
da
a
d
  . 
Since
0
) 1(0 AA
da
p
d
a

   , the second derivative of Aa with respect to at 
0 is 
2 2
2
0
2 2
2 2 2
2
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
( ) (1 ) ( )
[ ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )][ ( ) (1 ) ( )]
                
( ( ) (1 ) ( ))
               { (1 ) (1 )[ (1 ) ]} ( )
A
A
d a p A w pA w p A w
d pA w p A w
pA w pA w p A w p A w p A w
pA w p A w
p p p p p p w

    

  
        

  
       
                3 (1 ) ( ).Ap p w         (2.29) 
Hence, the Taylor’s expansion of Aa at 0  is 
  
2 23 (1 )(1 )( ) ()A Ap pa p ow     .   (2.30) 
Similarly, the Taylor’s expansion of Ba  at 0 is 
  
2 23 (1 )(1 )( ) ()B Bp pa p ow     .   (2.31) 
We know that A Ba a for sufficient small  since decision maker A always value 
the information higher than decision maker B when they both accept the lottery without 
the information (See (ii)). Hence, ( ) ( )A Bw w  by comparing their Taylor’s expansions 
in (2.30) and (2.31) since the residuals, 2( )o , are negligible when is sufficiently small. 
Since w is arbitrary, ( ) ( ),A Bw w w   .      □ 
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Theorem 2.3 shows the monotonicity of the value of information with risk 
aversion if the decision makers accept the lottery without the information. The more risk 
averse decision maker values information higher than the less risk averse one. The 
following example for exponential utility decision makers illustrates an application of 
this result. 
Example 2.1: 
Consider a group of decision makers having the exponential utility functions, 
( ) xU ex     , with risk aversion coefficients on the interval (0,0.2] . Suppose they 
all face a lottery X , which is scaled Beta distributed on the interval [ $100,$100], with 
parameters, 105, 95r k  , i.e. (105,95, 100,100)X Beta  . Direct calculation shows 
that ( ( ), ) 0,b U x w X  (0,0.2]  . Therefore, all these decision makers will accept 
the lottery without any further information.  
 
Figure 2.4. (a) ( , ) 0b U X  decreases with  ; (b) VOIA increases with  . 
Figure 2.4 (a) plots the indifference buying price versus and shows that it is 
indeed above zero over this interval. Moreover, as predicted by Lemma 2.1, it is 
monotonically decreasing. Since a decision maker with a higher  is more risk averse 
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than one with a lower  , Theorem 2.3 predicts that the value of information is 
monotonically increasing with   in this region. This is indeed the case as shown in 
Figure 2.4 (b). Figure 2.4 (b) also indicates that the value of information is bounded by 
] 0. 9[ 9 51E X   and ] 5. 9[ 9 51E X    as predicted by the refined bounds in Theorem 2.2.   
2.3.2. Rejecting the Lottery without the Information 
If a decision maker rejects the lottery X  without the information, then the value 
of information,VOI VOIR , and satisfies 
   [ ( )] ( )E U w X VOIR U w  .   (2.32) 
Comparing this expression to the definition of indifferent buying price in (2.1), 
we know that the value of information is the utility indifferent buying price of the 
potential gain, X  , after rejecting the lottery in this case.  
Theorem 2.4: If two decision makers A  and B  both reject a lottery X without any 
further information, then the following two statements are equivalent: 
where AVOIR  and BVOIR are the value of information for A and B when they reject the 
lottery X without the information (respectively). 
Proof: To simplify the notation, we denote Ar  and Br  as AVOIR  and BVOIR . 
 (i) (ii): From Jensen’s inequality, we have 
[ ( )] ( ) ( ( )) ( [ ( )])
                              [ ( ( ))] [ ( )].
A B
B B
E A w X A w G B w G E B w X
E G B w X E A w
r r
r rX
 
 
    
   
 
 
 
(i) ( x ) ( ) ( )A Bx x  ; 
(ii) ( ,w X ) A BVOIR VOIR , 
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Since A  is increasing, we obtain that A Br r . 
(ii) (i):  Similar to the proof of Theorem 2.3, we prove it by comparing the 
Taylor’s expansion of the value of information on a lottery with sufficient small risk. 
Again consider the same lottery in the proof of Theorem 2.3 (See Figure 2.3) and 
some given deterministic initial wealth, w . Both decision makers will reject it without 
the information, if p  is sufficiently small. From the definition of value of information, 
we know that 
( )] ( ) (1 ) ( ) ([ )AA AE A rw X r pA w p A w A wr
         . 
The derivative of Ar with respect to  is 
  
( )
( ) (1 ) ( )
A
A A
Adr pA w
d pA w p
r
r rA w
 

    


   (2.33) 
and 0Ar  when 0 . Therefore, its value at 0  is 
  
0
( )
( ) (1 ) ( )
Adr pA w p
d pA w p A w

 
  
.    (2.34) 
The second derivative of Ar with respect to is  
2
2
2
( )(1 )
( ) (1 ) ( )
( )( ( )((1 )) (1 ) ( ) )
           ,
( ( ) (1 ) ( ))
A A A
A A
A A A A A
A A
r
r r
r
d r pA w r
d pA w p A w
pA w pA w r p A w r
pA w p A
r r
r rw
  

   
        

   

 
  
 
 (2.35) 
where AA
dr
r
d
  . 
Since
0
(0) AA
dr
pr
d 
  , the second derivative of Ar with respect to at 0 is 
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2
2 2
0
( )(1 ) ( )( (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ))
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ( ) (1 ) ( ))
( )
               (1 ) (1 ) ( ).
( )
A
A
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(2.36) 
Hence, the Taylor’s expansion of 
Ar at 0  is 
  
2 2(1 ) ( )( ) (1 )A Apr p p ow    .   (2.37) 
Similarly, the Taylor’s expansion of Br  at 0  is 
  
2 2(1 ) ( )( ) (1 )B Bpr p p ow    .   (2.38) 
We know that A Br r  for sufficient small  since decision maker A always value 
the information lower than decision maker B when they both reject the lottery without the 
information (See (ii)). Hence, ( ) ( )A Bw w  by comparing their Taylor’s expansion in 
(2.37) and (2.38) since the residuals, 2( )o , are negligible when  is sufficiently small. 
Since w is arbitrary, ( ) ( ),A Bw w w   .       □ 
Theorem 2.4 shows the monotonicity of the value of information with risk 
aversion if the decision makers reject the lottery without the information. It asserts that 
the less risk averse decision maker will value information higher than the more risk 
averse one in this case. The following example illustrates this result.  
Example 2.2: 
Consider a group of decision makers with exponential utility functions, 
( ) ,xU x e     with risk aversion coefficients on the interval (0,1] . Suppose they all 
face a lottery X  that is scaled Beta distributed on the interval [ $100,$100], with 
parameters, 24, 26r k  , i.e. (24,26, 100,100)X Beta  . The mean of this lottery is
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[ ] $4E X   . Since [ ] 0E X  , then ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X  , (0,1]  , because the 
decision makers are risk averse over this interval. Therefore, they will all reject the 
lottery.  
  
          Figure 2.5. (a) ( , ) 0b U X  decreases with  ; (b) VOIR decreases with .   
Figure 2.5 (a) plots the indifference buying price versus and shows that it is 
indeed below zero over this interval. Moreover, as predicted by Lemma 2.1, it is 
monotonically decreasing. Figure 2.5 (b) plots the value of information for these risk 
averse decision makers over the range (0,1] , and verifies that it is indeed 
monotonically decreasing with   from 0 to 1 as predicted by Theorem 2.4.  
2.3.3. Indifference without the Information 
If a decision maker is indifferent between accepting or rejecting the lottery 
without the information, then any more risk averse (risk seeking) decision maker will 
reject (accept) the lottery without the information due to Lemma 2.1.  The following 
Theorem characterizes the value of information in this case.  
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Theorem 2.5: If decision maker A is indifferent between accepting and rejecting a lottery 
X without any further information, and if either of the following two conditions holds: 
then A BVOI VOI . 
Proof: Since decision maker A is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the 
lottery without the information, we know that [ ( )] ( )E A w X A w   and AVOI AVOIA
AVOIR . If (( ) )A Bx x  , x , then [ ( )] ( )E B w X B w   from Lemma 2.1 and the 
decision maker B  rejects the lottery X  without the information. Hence, A AVOI VOIR
B BVOIR VOI   
from Theorem 2.4. If ( )( ,)A Bx x x   , then [ ( )]E B w X ( )B w
from lemma 2.1 and the decision maker B  accepts the lottery X  without the information. 
Applying Theorem 2.3, we obtain that A AVOI VOIA  B BVOIA VOI  . □ 
Theorem 2.5 shows that a decision maker who is indifferent between accepting 
and rejecting an investment will value the information higher than any other decision 
maker with either higher or lower risk aversion functions. Therefore, a decision maker 
who is indifferent will have the highest value of information on the sensitivity analysis 
curve. We analyze this maximal value of information in section 2.4 and provide upper 
and lower bounds on its value. We also discuss the value of information when decision 
makers do not necessarily make the same accept/reject decisions without the information.     
2.4. Sensitivity to Risk Aversion: Defining a Utility Class 
It is simple to conduct sensitivity of the value of information to risk aversion 
within a certain family of utility functions by changing a parameter of the utility function. 
(i) ( ( ) ,) ,A B xx x   or 
(ii)  ( ) ( ),A B xx x   ,  
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For example, we conducted a sensitivity analysis of the value of information to the risk 
aversion coefficient for exponential utility functions class in Section 2.3. To generalize 
this approach, it will be useful to define a class of utility functions, { }U , having a 
parameter,  , and whose risk aversion function ( , )x   satisfies  
Note that U  is risk averse if 0  and is risk seeking if 0  .  This class 
applies to a wide range of utility functions. For example: 
(ii) Power utility functions:
1( ) , 0 1 ,  U x x x 
   , with 1 ( , )x x    .  
(iii) Logarithmic utility functions:  1( ) log ,  0,  0U x x x     .  
(iv) Risk neutral utility functions: 0( )U x x , has ( ,0) 0,x x   . 
In our work, we can now conduct the sensitivity analysis with respect to the 
parameter ,  and generalize the results to different families of utility functions within 
this class. We also discuss sensitivity analysis in situations where decision makers do not 
necessarily make the same accept/reject decisions without the information.  
2.4.1. Monotonicity of the Value of Information with Risk Aversion  
Let VOI  be the value of the information for a utility function, U . Two decision 
makers with utility functions belonging to a family in this class will make different 
accept/reject decisions without the information if and only if the signs of their preference 
(i)  ( ; )x  is continuous with  x  and  ;  
(ii)  1 2( , ) ( , ),x x x     if and only if 1 2  ; 
(iii)  ( ,0) 0,x x   .  
(i) Exponential utility functions: ( ) , 0
xU x e   
   , and 0( )U x x  with 
.( , )x   ;  
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indifferent buying price of X  are different. Since ( , )x  is continuous with x  and  , 
and ( ( ), )b U x w X   is also continuous with   then the decision makers will make 
different accept/reject decisions without the information if and only if there exists a 
critical value,
c  , such that  
    ( ( ), ) 0
c
b U x w X   .    (2.39) 
Case 1: Sensitivity Analysis when All Decision Makers make the Same Decision ( c  
does not exist on the interval of interest) 
Suppose we wish to conduct a sensitivity analysis over a range of decision makers 
who all make the same accept/reject decision without the information. In this case, the 
sign of ( ( ), )b U X w X   will not change. Decision makers with utility functions 
belonging to { }U   will all accept the lottery X  without the information if 
( ( ), ) 0,b U x w X     and will reject it if ( ( ), ) 0,b U x w X    . The following 
proposition characterizes the value of information in this setting.  
Proposition 2.1: Sensitivity of the Value of Information to Risk Aversion (Same 
Decision)  
(i) If ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X   ,  on a given interval, then VOI is monotonically 
increasing with  on this interval. 
(ii) If ( , ) 0b U X  ,   on a given interval, then VOI is monotonically 
decreasing with   on this interval. 
Proof: (i): If ( ( ), ) 0,b U x w X    , then all decision makers with the utility 
functions in { }U  accept the lottery X without the information. Theorem 2.3 shows that 
VOI  is monotonically increasing with   since ( , )x   is increasing with  . 
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(ii): If ( , ) 0,b U X   , then all decision makers with the utility functions in 
{ }U  reject the lottery X without the information. Theorem 2.4 indicates that VOI  is 
monotonically decreasing with   since ( , )x   is increasing with  .  □ 
Proposition 2.1 provides sufficient conditions for monotonicity of the value of 
information with risk aversion. Examples 2.1 and 2.2 in section 2.3 illustrated this result 
for positive and negative indifferent buying prices. Proposition 2.1 generalizes this result 
for utility functions within U .  
Case 2: Sensitivity Analysis when Decision Makers make different Decisions ( c  
exists on the interval of interest) 
If sensitivity analysis is conducted over a range where decision makers make 
different accept/reject decisions without the information, then we know that there exists 
c  such that ( ( ), ) 0,  cb U x w X      and ( ( ), ) 0,  .cb U x w X     The 
following Proposition characterizes the value of information for a sensitivity analysis 
conducted over a range where there exists c  such that the accept/reject decision without 
information changes.  
Proposition 2.2: Sensitivity of the Value of Information to Risk Aversion (Different 
Decisions) 
(i) If c   , then VOI  is monotonically increasing with  . 
(ii) If c   , then VOI  is monotonically decreasing with  . 
Proof: (i): If c  , then ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) 0cb U x w X b U x w X     due to Lemma 
2.1 and any decision maker with the utility function U  and such  accepts the lottery 
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X without the information. Theorem 2.3 shows that VOI  is monotonically increasing 
with  since ( , )x   is increasing with  . 
(ii): If 
c  , then ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) 0cb U x w X b U x w X      due to Lemma 2.1 
and any decision maker with the utility function U  and such  rejects the lottery X  
without the information. Theorem 2.4 shows that VOI  is monotonically increasing with 
 since ( , )x   is decreasing with  .      □ 
Proposition 2.2 provides important characteristics of the shape of the sensitivity 
analysis of value of information with respect to risk aversion. If we conduct the analysis 
over the critical point c , i.e. from  c   to c  , then the value of information 
curve must increase monotonically up to c  and then decrease monotonically.  Therefore, 
there must be a maximal value of information within this sensitivity analysis curve. We 
discuss this maximum value in more detail below.  
2.4.2. Maximal Value of Information within the Utility Class 
We now show that if the indifference buying price is zero, i.e. c  , and 
( ( ), ) 0,
c
b U x w X   then the value of information achieves its maximum value within 
this utility class.  
Theorem 2.6: Maximal Value of Information  
The decision maker whose indifference buying price is zero values the information on the 
lottery X highest among the decision makers with their utility functions in { }U . 
Formally,  
 ( ( ), ) 0 argma }.: x{U x w X VOb I 

   
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Proof: From Proposition 2.2 (i), we know that
c
VOI VOI   when c  . 
Conversely, 
c
VOI VOI   when c  from Proposition 2.2 (ii). Therefore, 
 max
c
VOI VOI 

 .         □ 
Define the maximal value of information, maxVOI , as 
 max maxVOI VOI

 . 
We now consider the bounds on the maximal value of information for lottery X  and 
utility class U , which depend on the sign of the mean value of the lottery.  
Proposition 2.3: Bounds on the maximal value of information  
If there exists c satisfying  ( ( ), ) 0cb U x w X   , then the following statements hold: 
Proof: (i): If [ ] 0E X  , then 0( ( ), ) ( ( ) [ ]) 0, ,b U x w X b U x w X E X    
0  . Hence, 0c  . Since the decision maker with the utility function cU is risk 
averse and indifferent between accepting and rejecting the lottery without the information, 
[ ]
c
E VX OIA
   [ ]
c
VOI XE
  from Theorem 2.2 (i). Since max cVOI VOI  from 
Theorem 2.6, we have max[ ] [ ]E VOI EX X
   . 
(ii): If [ ] 0E X  , then 0( ( ), ) ( [ ] 0,( ) 0, )b U x w X b U x X Xw E     . 
Therefore, 0c  . Since the decision maker with the utility function cU is risk seeking 
and indifferent between accepting and rejecting the lottery without the information, 
(i) If [ ] 0E X  , then 0c  and max[ ] [ ]E VOI EX X
   . 
(ii) If [ ] 0E X  , then 0c  and max[ ] [ ]E VOI EX X
   . 
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[ ]
c c
E VOIR VOIX  
    [ ]E X  from Theorem 2.2 (ii). Since max cVOI VOI from 
Theorem 2.6, we obtain that max[ ] [ ]E VOI EX X
   .    □ 
If the lottery has a positive expectation, then its indifferent buying price is always 
positive for any risk seeking utility. So the critical risk aversion, c , must be positive. 
Conversely, if the lottery has a negative expectation, then the critical risk aversion is 
negative. Note that the decision maker with such risk aversion may either accept or reject 
the lottery if its indifference buying price is zero. Theorem 2.2 offers upper and lower 
bounds on such maximal value of the information in Proposition 2.3.  
Example 2.3: 
Consider decision makers with utility functions in the exponential utility class 
with [ 0.2,1]  . Suppose that X has a scaled Beta distribution in [ 100,100] with 
26, 24r k  , i.e. (26,24, 100,100)X Beta   with mean [ ] 4E X  . Direct calculation 
shows that 0.041c   is the value of the risk aversion coefficient for which a decision 
maker will be indifferent to the lottery. Moreover, decision makers with c   will 
accept the lottery and those with c   will reject it without the informaition.  
Figure 2.6 (a) plots the indifference buying price versus  and shows that it is 
monotonically decreasing. Figure 2.6 (b) indicates that the value of information is 
monotonically increasing from 0.2    to 0.041c   and monotonically decreasing 
from 0.041c   to  1   as predicted by Proposition 2.2. Moreover, the value of 
information is a maximum at 0.041c   as predicted by Theorem 2.6.  Finally, the 
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maximal value of information, max 6.1964VOI  , lies between ] 3. 3[ 8 84E X
  and 
] 7. 3[ 8 84E X    as predicted by Proposition 2.3.   
 
 
Figure 2.6. (a) ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X   at 0c  ; (b) maxVOI at c and lies between ][E X
 and
][E X  . 
As a special case, if the lottery has zero mean, then the upper and lower bounds of 
the maximal value of information coincide since [ ] [ ]E X E X  .  
Proposition 2.4: Zero-Mean Lotteries 
 If [ ] 0E X   , then the risk neutral decision maker values the information higher than 
any risk averse or risk seeking decision maker. Moreover,  
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(i) If ( ) ( ) 0,A Bx x x    , then [ ] [ ]A BVOI VOI E X E X
   . 
(ii) If 0 ( ) ( ),A Bx x x    , then [ ] [ ]B AVOI VOI E X E X
    . 
(iii) If ( ; ) 0,x   , then [ ] [ ].V X XOI EE    
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Proof: (i): If ( ) ( ) 0,A Bx x x    , then [ ] 0( , ) ( , )A Bb U X b U X E X   and 
decision makers A and B  both reject the lottery X without the information. Hence, 
A AVOI VOIR   B BVOIR VOI  from Theorem 2.4. On the other hand, Theorem 2.1 (ii) 
shows that [ ]BVOI E X
 . 
(ii): If ( ) ( ) 0,A Bx x x    , then 0( , ) ( , ) [) 0( , ]A Bb U X b U X b U X E X    
and the decision makers A and B  both accept the lottery X without the information. 
Therefore, A AVOI VOIA   B BVOIA VOI  from Theorem 2.3. On the other hand, 
Theorem 2.1 (iii) shows that [ ]AVOI E X
 . 
(iii):  See Theorem 2.1 (i).        □ 
Example 2.4: 
Consider decision makers with utility functions in the exponential utility class 
with [ 0.2,1]  . Suppose that X  has a scaled Beta distribution in [ 100,100] with 
25r   , 25k  , i.e. (25,25, 100,100)X Beta   with mean [ ] 0E X  . Direct calculation 
shows that 0,c  since the lottery is symmetric for positive and negative values. 
Moreover, risk averse decision makers with 0   will reject the lottery and risk seeking 
decision makers with 0   will accept it. Figure 2.7 plots the sensitivity analysis of the 
indifference buying price and value of information to the risk aversion coefficient,  . 
  Figure 2.7 (a) shows that the critical indifference buying price for this zero-mean 
lottery occurs when 0c   (a risk neutral decision maker is indifferent to accepting it or 
not). Figure 2.7 (b) shows that a risk neutral decision maker (with 0  ) has a higher 
value of information for this zero-mean lottery than any risk averse or risk seeking 
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decision maker as predicted by Theorem 2.6. Moreover, the maximal value of 
information is equal to [ [ 5.6 38] 1]E X E X    .  
 
 
Figure 2.7. (a) ( , ) 0b U X   at 0c  ;  (b) max [ ] [ ]X EVOI E X
  at 0c  .  
2.5. Summary 
We consider the perfect information in two-action decision problems, where a 
decision maker with deterministic initial wealth, w , is deciding whether or not to buy an 
uncertain lottery, X . According to the different optimal decision without the information, 
we consider the value of information in three cases: 
i. If ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X  , then the decision maker accepts the lottery without the 
information.  In this case,  ( ) ( )][U w E U w X  and we write the value of 
informaiotn, VOI VOIA , which is given by   
   ([ ( )] [ )]VOIAE U Uw X E w X    ,  (2.40) 
       where max{ ,0}X X   is the potential gain of the lottery. 
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iii. If ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X  , then the decision maker is indifferent between 
accepting and rejecting the lottery without the information, Then
( ][ ( )[)]U w E UE w X  and the value of information, VOI VOIA VOIR  is 
defined by either (2.6) or (2.7). 
 Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961) showed that the expected value of perfect information 
is the minimum of the expectations of the potential gain and potential loss of the lottery. 
I.e. mi ][n{ ] }[ ,XVO E EI X   for a risk neutral decision maker, where 
max{ ,0}X X   .Mehrez (1985) proved that any risk averse decision maker value the 
pefect information less than the expectation of the potential gain of the lottery, i.e. 
[ ]VOI E X   for a risk averse decision maker. However, we prove that the value of 
information for a risk seeking decision maker is bounded by the expectation of the 
potential loss of the lottery, i.e. [ ]VOI E X   for a risk seeking decision maker. (See 
Theorem 2.1) Our result for risk seeking decision maker reveals the symmetry between 
[ ]E X   and [ ]E X   in the monotonicty of value of informaiton to the risk aversion. 
Conversely, we provide the lower bound of the value of perfect information given 
the knowledge of the optimal decision without the information.(See Theorem 2.2) 
Formally, if a risk averse decision maker accepts the lottery without the information, then 
the value of perfect information is greater than [ ]E X  . However, if a risk seeking 
decision maker rejects the lottery without the information, then he/she values the perfect 
information higher than [ ]E X  . 
ii. If ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X  , then the decision maker rejects the lottery without the 
information. In this case, ( ][ ( )[)]U w E UE w X  and we write the value of 
information VOI VOIR , which is given by  
   ) )[ (( ]VOI wE U R Uw X    .   (2.41) 
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Such refined bounds of the value of perfect information imply that the 
monotonicity of the value of perfect information to the risk aversion is also depending on 
the optimal decision without the information. For example, we consider two decision 
makers with the same deterministic initial wealth in a two-atction decision problem. If 
they both accept the lottery without the information, then the more risk averse decision 
maker will value the information higher than the less risk verse decision maker.(See 
Theorem 2.3) Howerver, if they both reject the lottery without the information, then the 
less risk averse decision maker will value the information higher than the more risk 
averse decision maker. (See Theorem 2.4) Finally, if a decision maker feels indifferent 
between accepting and rejcting the lottery without the information, then he/she will value 
the information higher than any decision maker with more or less risk aversion.(See 
Theorem 2.5). Moreover, Theorems 2.3 and 2.4 show that the higher value of information 
on any lottery also implies the more (or less) risk aversion. 
To interpret the shape of the sensitivity analysis curve of the value of information to the 
risk aversion function, we define a class of utility functions, { }U , having a parameter,  , 
and whose risk aversion function ( , )x   satisfies  
Consider decision makers with same initial wealth and utility functions in { }U . 
If all decision makers accept the lottery without the information, then their value of 
information VOI  is monotonically increasing with  . Conversely, if all decision makers 
(i)  ( ; )x  is continuous with  x  and  ;  
(ii)  1 2( , ) ( , ),x x x     if and only if 1 2  ; 
(iii)  ( ,0) 0,x x   .  
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reject the lottery without the information, then their value of information VOI  is 
monotonically decreasing with  . (See Proposition 2.1). However, if there exist 
c  such 
that ( ( ), ) 0
c
b U x w X   , then any decision maker with c   will rejct the lottery 
without the information and VOI  is monotonically decreasing with   in this region. 
Conversely, any decision maker with 
c   will accept the lottery without the 
information and VOI  is monotonically increasing with   in this region. (See 
Proposition 2.2) Finally, the decision maker with c values the information maximal 
among all decision makers with utility functions in { }U . (See Theorem 2.6) Moreover, 
such maximum is always between [ ]E X   and [ ]E X   whatever the sign of the 
expectation of the lottery. (See Proposition 2.3) As a special case, Proposition 2.4 
indicates that any risk averse or risk seeking decision maker values the information lower 
than its expectation.  
We summarize our results for the sensitivity analysis in Table 2.1. Note that these 
results do not rely on knowing the accept/reject decision without the information. 
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 Lottery        
Risk 
Attitude 
 
[ ] 0E X   
 
[ ] 0E X   
 
[ ] 0E X   
Risk Averse 
( , ) 0,
0
x 



 
max[ ] [ ]E VOI EX X
 
Shape of the Sensitivity  
Analysis Curve: 
VOI increases with  until c  
and then decreases with .  
 
[ ] [ ]XVOI E E X   
Shape of the Sensitivity 
Analysis Curve: 
VOI  decreases with .  
[ ] [ ]XVOI E E X   
Shape of the Sensitivity  
Analysis Curve: 
VOI  decreases with .  
Risk Neutral 
( , ) 0,
0
x 



 
[ ] [ ]VOI E X E X    [ ] [ ]VOI E X E X    [ ] [ ]VOI E X E X    
Risk Seeking
( , ) 0,
0
x 



 
[ ] [ ]XVOI E E X   
Shape of the Sensitivity  
Analysis Curve: 
VOI  increases with .  
[ ] [ ]XVOI E E X   
Shape of the Sensitivity  
Analysis Curve: 
VOI  increases with .  
max[ ] [ ]E VOI EX X
   
Shape of the Sensitivity  
Analysis Curve: 
VOI increases with until c  
and then decreases with .  
Table 2.1. Characterizing the shape of the sensitivity analysis curve for the value of information 
for different lotteries and decision makers with different risk attitudes. Recall that ( , )x 
increases with  , and c satisfies ,( ) 0cb XU  .  
 42 
 
CHAPTER 3 
MONOTONICITY OF VALUE OF INFORMATION WITH UNCERTAIN 
INITIAL WEALTH 
We considered the two-action decision problem with the assumption that the 
decision makers have deterministic initial wealth in Chapter 2. However, the portfolio of 
the decision maker may consist of multiple risky lotteries in practice. The initial wealth 
of the decision maker is uncertain in such case. We now show the monotonicity of value 
of information with respect to different measures of risk aversion in the two-action 
decision problem when the initial wealth is uncertain. All utility functions in this chapter 
are strictly increasing and second order continuous differentiable. This chapter is 
organized as follows. We formulate the two-action decision problem with uncertain 
initial wealth in section 3.1. We proof that the Rubistein’s measure of risk aversion is 
corresponding to the independent initial wealth in section 3.2. We show that the Ross’s 
measure of risk aversion is applied for the lottery with constant conditional expectation 
on initial wealth in section 3.3. We summarize the main results and discuss the related 
work in section 3.4. 
3.1. Problem Formulation  
We now consider the value of perfect information in two-action decision 
problems where the initial wealth is uncertain. 
3.1.1. Value of Information with Uncertain Initial Wealth 
A decision maker with a second order differentiable and strictly increasing utility 
function, U , owns some uncertain initial wealth, w . He/she is deciding whether or not to 
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invest a risky lottery with a discrete or continuous distribution. Let X  be the net profit of 
this risky lottery (its profit less its cost), and ( ( ), )b XwU x  be its utility indifferent 
buying price, which is a certain amount defined by 
   [ ( ( , ))] [ ( )]E U w X b U X E U w   .   (3.1) 
We consider the random signal S defined in section 2.1.3, which also offers the 
perfect information. Moreover, the decision tree is similar to Figure 2.2 except that the 
initial wealth, w , is uncertain. Since the knowledge of the random signal S offers the 
decision maker an opportunity of avoiding the potential loss of the lottery and earning its 
potential gain simultaneously, the value of information, VOI, in the two-action decision 
problem is defined by 
  max{ [ ( )],[ ( )  ( )] ][ }VOI EE U w X w wU E U X    . (3.2) 
According to the different decision without the information, we can classify the 
value of information in two classes. Formally, we consider the sign of the indifferent 
buying price of the lottery, ( ( ), )b XwU x  , as follows: 
i. If ( ( ), ) 0wb U x X  , then [ ( )] [ ( )]E U w X E U w   and the decision maker 
accepts the lottery without the information. The value of information, 
VOI=VOIA, is defined as 
   ([ ( )] [ )]VOIA E UE U w X w X    .  (3.3) 
ii. If ( ( ), ) 0wb U x X  , then [ ( )] [ ( )]E U w X E U w   and the decision maker 
rejects the lottery without the information. The value of information, 
VOI=VOIR, is defined as 
   [ ([ )( ) ]]VOIR EE U w X wU   .   (3.4) 
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In particular, if ( ( ), ) 0wb U x X  , then [ ( )] [ ( )]E U w X E U w   and the 
decision maker feel indifferent between accepting and rejecting the lottery without the 
information. The value of information in such case is given by both (3.3) and (3.4). 
Moreover, the value of information, VOI  is always the minimum of two value of 
information given accept/reject decision without the information by comparing the 
equations (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4). Formally, 
    min{ },VOI VOIA VOIR .   (3.5) 
3.1.2. The Arrow-Pratt Measure and Uncertain Initial Wealth  
Chapter 1 presents the monotonicity between the value of information and risk 
aversion in Arrow-Pratt sense. However, it is not the case when the initial wealth is 
uncertain. 
Example 3.1: Value of Information is not Monotone with Risk Aversion in the 
Arrow-Pratt Sense when Initial Wealth is Uncertain 
Consider the decision makers having the same initial wealth, w , which is binary 
distributed between $1000 and $2000 with same probability. (See Figure 3.1) 
, 
Figure 3.1. Binary distributed initial wealth with equal probability. 
Suppose their utility functions are normal distribution functions with different 
variances,
2950
0
[950, ) [0.001,0.00( , , 5]) t
x
U x e dt x 

     , and their risk averse 
functions are ( ) 2 ( 950), [950, ) [0.001,0.005].,x xx        Assume that they face 
1000
0.5
2000
0.5
w
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a lottery with binary distribution between -$50 and $52 with equal probability. We also 
assume that the lottery is independent of the initial lottery. Direct Calculation shows that 
the indifferent buying price of the lottery is positive if 
33.8931 10c 
  and that it is 
negative otherwise. So the decision makers with [0.00 ]1, c  will accept the lottery 
without the information and the decision makers with ,0.[ 005]c  will reject the lottery 
without the information.  
 
Figure 3.2. (a) Indifferent buying price is not monotonically decreasing; (b) Value of 
information is not monotonically increasing in accept region 
Figure 3.2 (a) plots the indifferent buying price of the lottery versus  and shows 
that it is not monotonically decreasing in the accept region ( [0.00 ]1, c  ). Figure 3.2 (b) 
plots the value of information versus  and shows that it is also not monotonically 
increasing in such region, which indicates that Theorem 2.3. does not hold in this 
example when the initial wealth is uncertain. 
3.1.3. Assumptions on Initial Wealth and the Lottery 
Example 3.1 implies that the value of information is not monotone with the risk 
aversion in the Arrow-Pratt sense when initial wealth is uncertain even if the lottery is 
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independent of the initial wealth. However, there exists a measure of risk aversion make 
the monotonicity holds in such settings. Moreover, there also exists an even stronger 
measure of risk aversion such that the same monotonicity holds under some weaker 
assumptions on the independence between the lottery and the initial wealth. More 
precisely, we consider the following independent assumptions in the following two 
sections, respectively: 
(A.1) The lottery, X , is independent of the initial wealth, w . 
(A.2) The conditional expectation of the potential gain of the lottery on the 
initial wealth is constant. I.e. 
    [ | ] [ ].E X E Xw      (3.6) 
(A.3) The conditional expectation of the potential loss of the lottery on the initial 
wealth is constant. I.e. 
    [ | ] [ ].E X E Xw      (3.7) 
If the lottery, X , is independent of the initial wealth, w , then the potential gain 
of the lottery, X  , and the potential loss, X  , are both independent of the initial wealth, 
w . Their condition expectations on the initial wealth are constant in such case. Hence, 
(A.1) implies (A.2) and (A.3). However, the conversion does not hold.  
Example 3.2:  
Again consider the binary distributed initial wealth, w , in example 1. The lottery 
X is scaled beta distributed on different intervals and with different parameters when the 
initial wealth $1000w   or $2000w  . Formally, if $2000w  , then the lottery X is 
scaled Beta distributed on the interval [-$600, $600], with  parameters, 3k  , 3r  . I.e. 
(3,3, 600,600)X Beta  . If 1000w  , then the lottery X is scaled Beta distributed on 
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the interval [-$500, $500], with parameters, 2k  , 2r  . I.e. (2,2, 500,500)X Beta  . 
Figure 3.3 (a) and Figure 3.3 (b) plot the density functions of the lottery X  when initial 
wealth, 2000w   and 1000w  , which are denoted as 00| 2 0X wf   and 00| 1 0X wf  , 
respectively.  
Figure 3.3. (a) The density function of the lottery when initial wealth is high; (b) The 
density function of the lottery when initial wealth is low. 
Figure 3.3 (a) shows that the conditional expectations of the potential gain and the 
potential loss are both 93.75 when the initial wealth is high, which can be directly 
calculated from the density function of the lottery in such case. I.e.
2000[ | ] [ | 2000]E E XwX w   93.75.  Direct calculation also indicates that the 
expectations of potential gain and the potential loss are 93.75 as well, which is showed in 
Figure 3.3 (b). I.e. [ | ]1000X wE    2000[ | ] 93.75.E X w  Therefore, the condition 
expectation of the potential loss and potential gain on the initial wealth are constant. I.e.
[ | ] 93.75E X w   and [ | ] 93.75E X w  . However, the lottery, X, is not independent of 
the initial wealth, w since the density function of the lottery given high initial wealth (See 
Figure 3.3 (a)) is different from the density function of the lottery given low initial wealth 
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(See Figure 3.3 (b)). Hence the assumptions (A.2) and (A.3) are essentially milder than 
the assumption (A.1). 
3.2. Monotonicity of Value of Information with Independent Initial Wealth 
We now show the effects of risk aversion on value of information in two-action 
decision problem when the lottery is independent of the initial wealth. More formally, 
consider two decision makers A  and B  with the same uncertain initial wealth, w , and 
utility functions AU  and BU , respectively. Let A and B  be the risk aversion function of 
A and B, respectively. We also assume that the lottery, X, is independent of the initial 
wealth, w . I.e. The assumption (A.1) holds in this section. Moreover, either the lottery or 
the initial wealth is called to be independent in short in this case. 
3.2.1. Rubinstein’s Measure of risk aversion 
Rubinstein (1973) introduced an alternative measure of risk aversion, ( )UR W , 
which is the ratio  
   
[ ( )]
( )
[ ( )]
U
E U W
R W
E U W

 

,    (3.8) 
where the expectation is taken over the final wealth, W , U and U   are the first and the 
second order derivatives of the utility function,U , respectively. 
Then AU is more risk averse than BU  in the Rubinstein’s sense if and only if 
   ( ) ( ),A BR R W WW   ,    (3.9) 
where ( )AR W and ( )BR W are the Rubinstein’s risk aversion of AU  and BU  over the final 
wealth W , respectively. 
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The Rubinstein’s measure of risk aversion is widely used in portfolio problems 
and the calculation of risk premiums when the decision maker is facing some 
independent lotteries (see Kihlstrom, Romer and Williams 1981, Pratt and Zeckhauser 
1987, Rubinstein 1973, Li and Ziemba 1993). Moreover, if the final wealth is 
deterministic, then the Rubinstein’s risk aversion over such final wealth is the Arrow-
Pratt’s risk aversion at that point. Therefore, the more risk averse decision maker in 
Rubinstein’s sense is more risk averse in the Arrow-Pratt sense. However, the conversion 
does not hold. Kihlstrom, Romer and Williams (1981) considered two polynomial utility 
functions such that the more risk averse one in the Arrow-Pratt’s sense has a smaller 
Rubinstein’s risk aversion over a particular final wealth. Their results also indicate the 
following two useful facts: 
Fact 1: If ( )}m (in{ max }{ )A B
x y
x y   , then ( ) ( ),A BR R W WW   . 
Fact 2: Assume that ( ) ( ) 0,A Bx x x    . If either ( )A x or ( )B x is decreases 
with x , then ( ) ( ) 0,A BR W R W W   . 
Fact 1 indicates that if ( ) 0,U xx   , then ( ) 0, WR W   . Therefore, the risk 
averse decision maker in the Arrow-Pratt’s sense is also risk averse in the Rubinstein’s 
sense and vice verse. Fact 2 shows that the Rubinstein’s measure of risk aversion is 
equivalent to the Arrow-Pratt’s for decreasing risk averse utility functions, which are 
widely used in decision analysis. For examples, the exponential utility functions, the 
logarithm utility functions and the power utility functions are all decreasing risk averse.  
We shows that the more risk averse decision maker has lower indifferent buying 
price than less risk averse one when they both has the same deterministic initial wealth in 
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Lemma 2.1. We now generalize this result to uncertain initial wealth with Assumption 
(A.1).  
Lemma 3.1: Monotonicity Between Indifferent Buying Price of Independent Lottery 
and Risk Aversion in Rubinstein’s Sense 
If ( ) ( ),A BR RW W W  , then ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )b A x X b Bw x Xw   , ,X w are independent, 
where ( ( ), )b XwA x   and ( ( ), )b XwB x   are indifferent buying price of the lottery, X, 
for decision maker A and B, respectively. 
Proof: Kihlstrom, Romer and Williams (1981) defined the equivalent utility 
function of a utility function,U ,with initial wealth, w , ( )wU x , by  
   ( ) [ ( )],wU U xx E x w   ,    (3.10) 
where [ ]E  is the expectation operator on the uncertain initial wealth, w . Let ,U w  be its 
risk aversion function. Direct calculation shows that  
  ,
( , ) [ ( )]
( ) ( )
( , ) [ ( )]
U Uw
U x E U x
x R
w
x
U x E
w
w
w U x w

  
     
  
.  (3.11) 
The indifferent buying price of any given independent lottery X for a decision 
maker with any given uncertain initial wealth, w  and utility function U , ( ( ), )b U x w X , 
is defined by 
  ( ( ), )[ ( )] [ ( )] (0)ww X b U x w XE U E U Uw     .  (3.12) 
Since the lottery, X , is independent of the initial wealth, w , the left hand side of 
(3.12) satisfies 
[ ( )] [ [ ( ) | ]]
                                             
( ( ), ) ( ( ), )
( ( )   , )[ ( )].w
w X b U x w X w X b U x w X w
b U x w
E U E E U
E U X X
     
 


 (3.13) 
From (3.12) and (3.13), we know that  
 51 
 
   ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )wb U x w X b U x X  ,   (3.14) 
where ( ( ), )wb U x X is the indifferent buying price of the lottery X for a decision maker 
with utility function ( )wU x  with zero initial wealth.  
If ( ) ( ),A BR R W WW   , then ( ) ( )A Bw wR x R x   , i.e. , ( )wA x  , ( ),wB x x . 
Hence, ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )w wb A x w X b A x X b B x X b B x w X     , where ( ( ), )wb A x X
and ( ( ), )wb B x X  are the indifferent buying price of the lottery X for decision makers A  
and B with zero initial wealth.       □ 
Lemma 3.1 implies that a more risk averse decision maker will have a lower 
indifference buying price for the independent lottery than a less risk averse decision 
maker. Consequently, if a decision maker rejects the independent lottery, then any more 
risk averse decision maker will also reject it. Conversely, if a decision maker accepts the 
independent lottery, then any less risk averse decision maker will also accept it. 
3.2.2. Monotonicity Between Value of Information and Risk Aversion in 
Rubinstein's Sense 
Recall to Example 3.2, we know that there is no monotonicity between risk 
aversion in the Arrow-Pratt sense and the value of information given the knowledge of 
accept/reject decision without the information when the lottery is independent of the 
uncertain initial wealth. However, we can show that the value of information is monotone 
with the risk aversion in the Rubinstein’s sense in such settings.  
More precisely, if the decision makers accept the lottery without the information, 
then the value of information, VOI VOIA , is defined in (3.3).  
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Theorem 3.1: If two decision makers A  and B  both accept an independent lottery X
without any further information, then the following two statements are equivalent: 
where 
AVOIA  and BVOIA are the value of information for A and B when they accept the 
lottery X without the information (respectively). 
Proof: From (3.11), we know that ( ) ( ),A BR R W WW    if and only if 
, ,( ) ( ),A w wBx x  ,x w  . If the lottery X is independent of the initial wealth, w , then  
 
[ ( [ ( )] [ ( )]
                                           [ [ ( ) | ]]
                                           [ ( )]
)]
.
w A
A
w A
E A X E A E A
E E A
w X w X a
w X a
XA
w
aE




    
 

  (3.15) 
Therefore, Aa is the value of information for a decision maker with utility 
function ( ; )AU x w  and zero initial wealth. Similarly, Ba is the value of information for a 
decision maker with utility function ( ; )BU x w  and zero initial wealth. From Theorem 2.3, 
we know that , ,( ) ( ),A Bw wx xx    if and only if A Ba a  for any given uncertain initial 
wealth, w . Since w  is arbitrary, Theorem 3.1 holds for any independent lottery and initial 
wealth.          □ 
Comparing to accepting the lottery directly without the information, the decision 
maker avoids suffering the potential loss if he/she acts after obtaining the information. 
Since the more risk averse decision maker value uncertain loss higher than the less risk 
averse one, he/she values such information higher as well. The following example for 
exponential utility decision makers illustrates an application of this result. 
(i)  ( W ) ( ) ( )A BR RW W ; 
(ii) ( ,w X are independent) A BVOIA VOIA , 
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Example 3.3: 
Consider a group of decision makers having exponential utility functions, 
( ) xU ex     , with risk aversion coefficients,  , on the interval (0,0.02]  . In 
addition, their uncertain initial wealth are the same and scaled Beta distributed on the 
interval [$1000, $2000], with parameters, 25,  25k r  .I.e. (25,25,1000,2000).w Beta  
Suppose they all face an independent lottery, X , which is a scaled Beta distributed on the 
interval [ $300,$700], with parameters, 25, 25r k  , i.e. (25,25, 300,700)X Beta  . 
Direct calculation shows that ( ( ), ) 0 [0,0.02],b U x Xw    . Therefore, all these 
decision makers will accept the independent lottery without the information. 
 
Figure 3.4. (a) ( ( ), ) 0wb U x X  decreases with  ; (b) VOIA  increases with  . 
Figure 3.4 (a) plots the indifference buying price versus their risk aversion 
coefficients,  , and shows that it is above zero over this interval and monotonically 
decreasing with  , which is predicted by Lemma 3.1. Moreover, Theorem 3.1 predicts 
that the value of information is monotonically increasing with   in this region since the 
risk aversion is increasing with   in Rubinstein’s sense due to fact 1. This is indeed the 
case as shown in Figure 3.4 (b). Moreover, Figure 3.4 (a) shows that the indifferent 
buying price is monotone decreasing with the risk aversion coefficient, which is predicted 
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by lemma 3.1. Figure 3.4 (b) also indicates that the value of information in example 3.3 
has a lower bound [ ] 5.9682E X   , which holds for any risk averse decision maker 
when they accept the independent lottery without the information. Formally, 
Corollary 3.1: If the lottery X is independent of the initial wealth, w , then the value of 
information has the following bounds: 
(i) For any risk seeking decision maker, 0 ][VOI XE
  ; 
(ii) If a risk averse decision maker accepts the lottery X without the 
information, then [ ]VOIA E X  . 
Proof: (i) Since [ [ ]] [ ]w X w XE E X E    , we know that 0 [ ]VOIA E X
 , 
where 0VOIA  
is the value of information for a risk neutral decision maker when he/she 
accept the lottery without the information. From Theorem 3.1, we know that 
0VOIA VOIA  for any risk seeking decision maker. Since max{ , }VOI VOIA VOIR 
VOIA , (i) holds. 
(ii) 0 [ ]VOIA VOIA E X
 
 
for any risk averse decision maker due to Theorem 
3.1.           □ 
On the other hand, if two decision makers reject an independent lottery without 
any further information, then the less risk averse decision maker in Rubinstein’s sense 
value the information higher than more risk averse one.      
Theorem 3.2: If two decision makers A  and B  both reject an independent lottery X
without any further information, then the following two statements are equivalent: 
(i) ( W ) ( ) ( )A BR RW W ; 
(ii)  ( ,w X are independent) A BVOIR VOIR , 
 55 
 
where 
AVOIR  and BVOIR are the value of information for A and B when they reject the 
lottery X without the information (respectively). 
Proof: With the same argument as the proof of Theorem 3.1, we only need to 
prove the equivalent deterministic initial wealth case. Theorem 2.4 indicates that the 
equivalent deterministic initial wealth case does hold.    □ 
Comparing to rejecting the lottery directly without the information, the decision 
maker earns its positive profit by observing the information before acting. Since the more 
risk averse decision maker value uncertain gain lower than the less risk averse one, 
he/she values such information lower as well.  
Example 3.4: 
Again consider the same decision makers described in example 3.2. Suppose they 
all face an independent lottery X , which is scaled Beta distributed on the interval 
[ $510,$490], with parameters, 25, 25r k  , i.e. (25,25, 510,490)X Beta  . The 
expectation of the independent lottery is [ ] 10 0E X    . Since all decision makers are 
risk averse, ( ( ), ) 0 [0,0.02],b U x Xw    . Therefore, they will accept the 
independent lottery without the information.  
 
Figure 3.5.  (a) ( ( ), ) 0wb U x X  decreases with  ; (b) VOIA decreases with  . 
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Figure 3.5 (a) plots the indifference buying price versus their risk aversion 
coefficients,  , and shows that it is indeed below zero over this interval. As predicted by 
Lemma 3.1, it is monotonically decreasing as well. Figure 3.5 (b) plots the value of 
information for these exponential decision makers with their risk aversion coefficient
[0,0.02]  , and indicates that it is monotonically decreasing with  , as predicted by 
Theorem 3.2. 
Moreover, Figure 3. 5 (b) indicates that the value of information for exponential 
decision makers has an upper bound [ ] 23.3495E X   , which holds for any risk averse 
decision maker when they rejects the independent lottery without the information. 
Formally, the following bounds hold. 
Corollary 3.2: If the lottery X is independent of the initial wealth w , then the value of 
information has the following bounds: 
(i) For any risk averse decision maker, 0 ][VOI XE
  ; 
(ii) If a risk seeking decision maker rejects the lottery X without the 
information, then [ ]VOIR E X  . 
(iii) If [ ] 0E X  , then [ ] [ ]VOI E X E X    for any risk averse or risk 
seeking decision makers. 
Proof: (i) Since [ [ ]] [ ]E E Xw wEX    , 0 [ ]VOIR E X
 , where 0VOIR is the 
value of information for a risk neutral decision maker when he/she accept the lottery 
without the information. Note that 0VOIR VOIR  for any risk averse decision maker due 
to Theorem 3.2 and that max{ , }VOI VOIA VOIR VOIR  , we obtain that (i) holds. 
(ii) 0 [ ]VOIR VOIR E X
  for any risk seeking decision maker from Theorem 
3.2. 
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(iii) From Corollary 3.1 (i) and Corollary 3.2 (i).    □ 
We summarize the bounds on value of information for the decision makers with 
different risk attitudes with respect to their different optimal decision without the 
information in Table 3.1.  
        Optimal decision 
Risk Attitude Accept without information Reject without information 
          Risk Averse ][ ][VOIA EE X X     0 [ ]VOIR E X    
          Risk Neutral [ ]EVOIA X
  [ ]VOIR E X   
          Risk Seeking 0 [ ]VOIA E X    ][ ][VOIR EE X X     
Table 3.1. Bounds on value for value of information for independent lottery given 
the knowledge of accept/reject decision without the information 
A risk neural decision maker feels indifferent between accepting and rejecting a 
zero mean lottery without any information, he/she value the information higher than any 
risk averse or risk seeking one, as predicted in Corollary 3.2. It is true that the decision 
maker who is indifferent between accepting and rejecting an independent lottery without 
any further information values the information higher than any more or less risk averse 
one in the Rubinstein’s sense.  
Theorem 3.3: If decision maker A is indifferent between accepting and rejecting an 
independent lottery X without any further information, and if either of the following two 
conditions holds: 
then A BVOI VOI . 
(i) ( ) ( ),A BR R W WW   or 
(ii)  ( ) ( ),A BR R W WW   ,  
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Proof: If ( ) ( ),A BR R W WW   , then decision maker B will accept the 
independent lottery, X, without the information due to Lemma 3.1 and 
A A B BVOI VOIA VOIA VOI   due to Theorem 3.1. If ( ) ( ),A BR R W WW   , then 
decision maker B will reject the independent lottery, X, without the information due to 
Lemma 3.1 and 
A AVOI VOIR  B BVOIR VOI due to Theorem 3.2.   □ 
Example 3.5: 
Again consider the same decision makers described in example 3.2. Suppose they 
face an independent lottery X , which is scaled Beta distributed on the interval[ $490,
$510] , with parameters, 50, 50r k  , i.e. (50,50, 490,510)X Beta  . Direct 
calculation shows that ( ( ), ) 0wb U x X  when 38.0863 10   . Therefore, decision 
maker A with risk aversion efficient 
38.0863 10A
  feels indifferent between 
accepting and rejecting the lottery without the information. 
 
Figure 3.6.  (a) 8.0863A   with ( ( ), ) 0wb U x X  ; (b) AVOI  
lies between [ ]E X   and 
[ ]E X  . 
Figure 3.6 (a) plots the indifference buying price versus their risk aversion 
coefficients,  , and shows that it is monotonically decreasing. Figure 3.6 (b) plots the 
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value of information for these exponential decision makers with their risk aversion 
coefficient [0,0.02]  , and shows that decision maker A value the information higher 
than any other decision makers, as predicted by theorem 3.3. Moreover, Figure 3.6 (b) 
also shows that value of information for decision maker A lies between [ ] 25.2943E X  
and [ ] 15.2943E X   , which is predicted by Corollaries 3.1 and 3.2 since decision maker 
A is risk averse and may accept the lottery without the information.   
3.3.  Monotonicity of Value of Information with Milder Conditions 
We now discuss the effects of risk aversion on value of information in two-action 
decision problem under the assumptions (A.2) or (A.3). Again consider two decision 
makers A  and B  with the same uncertain initial wealth, w , and utility functions AU  and 
BU , respectively.  
3.3.1. Ross’s Measure of Risk Aversion 
Theorems in Chapter 2 indicate that the Arrow-Pratt sense of risk aversion is 
correlated to the value of information in the two-action decision problem when the initial 
wealth is deterministic. We extend these results to independent initial wealth case with 
the Rubinstein’s measure of risk aversion. However, both measures of risk aversion are 
not valid if the lottery is not independent of the initial wealth. The following example on 
some asymptotic behavior of value of information for particular uncertain initial wealth 
and lotteries shows that theorem 4 does not hold when the lottery is dependent of the 
initial wealth.  
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Example 3.6: 
Consider the initial wealth, w , which is binary distributed as follows, 
 
Figure 3.7. Binary initial wealth. 
And the lottery, X, is binary distributed with different parameters for either initial 
wealth as 
 
Figure 3.8. Conditional binary lottery with different parameters. 
Direct calculation shows that [ ] 0E X w  when k is large enough. Therefore, any 
risk averse decision maker rejects the lottery X without the information. Note that the 
value of information on such lottery is sufficiently close to its Taylor’s expansion (up to 
second order term) when  is small enough. To compare the value of information for two 
risk averse decision makers, we rely on their Taylor’s expansions of value of information 
since the higher value of information exhibits the larger expansion. To simplify the 
notation, we denote  AVOIR  and BVOIR as Ar  and Br . Then 
y1 p
x
p
w
1
2
2 1
2
1
2
1
2
      
               if ,
   -
        
               if .
      -
k
k
k
k
w x
k
X
w y
k
 61 
 
  12 2
[ ( )] ( ) (1 ) ( ) [ ( )]
             ( ) (2 1) ( ) ( ) ( ) .p pA A A Ak
AE A w pA x p A y E A w X
A x k r k A x r A y r A y
r
r


    
        

  
Direct calculation shows that 0Ar   when 0 . Differentiating Ar with respect to 
yields
 
( ) (1 ) ( )
,
( ) (2 1) ( ) (1 ){ ( ) ( )}
A A
A A A A
Adr kpA x k k p A y
d pA x k k pA x k p A y
r
r r rA
r
r y
 
 
    

          
 
and 
0
1
2
Adr
d 
 . 
Differentiating A
dr
d
with respect to  and fix 0 yields 
2
2
0
(2 1) ( ) (1 ) ( )
4( ( ) (1 ) ( ))
Ad r p k A x p A y
d pA x p A y

   

  
. 
If is small enough, the Taylor’s expansion of the value of information for 
decision maker A indicates that 
  
2 2(2 1) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ).
2 4( ( ) (1 ) ( ))
A
p k A x p A y
r o
pU x p U y
   
 
  
   (3.16) 
If p  is sufficiently small such that ( ) (1 ) ( )pA x p A y  and if k  is larger 
enough such that (2 1) ( ) (1 ) ( )p k A x p A y   , then 
   
2 2(2 1) ( ) ( ).
2 4(1 ) ( )
A
p k A x
r o
p A y

 



   (3.17) 
Similarly, we can obtain the Taylor’s expansion of Br  in such settings as 
   
2 2(2 1) ( ) ( ).
2 4(1 ) ( )
B
p k B x
r o
p B y

 



   (3.18) 
Consider two decision makers A  and B having their exponential utilities, 
( )A
axU x e   and ( ) bxBU x e
  , with 0a b  . Then ( ) ( ),BAR W a b R WW    . 
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However, if x y is so large that ( ) ( )a y x b y xa ebe   , then direct calculation from (3.17) 
shows that the Taylor’s expansion of the value of information for A and B, 
Ar  and Br , 
satisfies  
2 2( 2 2) ( )(2 1) (2 1)( ) ( ) .
2 4(1 ) 2 4(1 )
a y x b y x
A B
p k p k
r ae o be o r
p p
       



 (3.19) 
So decision maker A  values the information for such lottery higher than decision 
maker B  when both of them reject the lottery without the information, though he/she is 
strictly more risk averse in the Rubinstein’s sense, which indicates that Theorem 3.2 may 
not hold when the lottery is dependent of the initial wealth. 
Ross (1981) introduced a stronger measure of risk aversion for risk averse utility 
functions. Machina and Neilson (1987) extended his results to the all utility functions and 
defined that AU is more risk averse than BU in the Ross’s sense, SA B   if and only if  
   
( ) ( )
,
( )
,
( )B
A
A
BU x U x
U y
x y
U y
 


  

.    (3.20) 
Direct calculation shows that the Ross’s measure of risk aversion is stronger than 
the Rubinstein’s one. Formally, If SA B  , then ( ) ( ),A BR R W WW   . Moreover, 
similar to the Rubinstein’s measure of risk aversion and independent lottery, the more 
risk averse decision maker in Ross’s measure has lower indifferent buying price of a 
lottery with constant conditional expectation on the initial wealth. 
Lemma 3.2: If ( ) ( )SA Bx x  , then ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )b A x X b Bw x Xw   , ,X w  satisfying 
[ | ]E X w E [ ]X . 
Proof: if [ | ] [ ]E X w E X , then [ | ( , )] [ ]E X w b A X E X   . Since ( ) ( )SA Bx x  , 
Machina and Neilson (1987) proved that 
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 ( , ; ( ( ), )) ( , ; ( ( ), ))CE A X w b A x w X CE B X w b A x w X    , (3.21) 
where )( , ;CE A X w and )( , ;CE B X w are the certain equivalent of the lottery, X, for A and 
B with the initial wealth, w .I.e. )( , ;CE A X w and )( , ;CE B X w are constants defined by 
  [ ( [ ()] )( , )];w X wE A E A CE A wX   ,   (3.22) 
and   
  [ ( [ ()] )( , )];w X wE B E B CE B wX   .   (3.23) 
By directly comparing the definition of certain equivalent in (3.22) and the 
different buying price in (3.1), we know that 
  ( ( ), ) ( , ; ( ( ), ))b A x X CE A X b A x Xw w w   .  (3.24) 
Since B is monotonically increasing,  (3.21)  and (3.24) imply 
( ( ), ) )
( ( ), ) ( , ; ( ( ), )))
( ( ), ) ( , ; ( ( ), )))
( ( ), ) ( ( ),
[ ( ]
[ ( ]
[ ( ]
[ ( )]
[ ( )
)
( ( ), ) )
]
[ ( ].
w b A x w X X
w b A x w X CE B X w b A x w X
w b A x w X CE
E B
E B
E B
E B
E B
E B
A X w b A x w X
w b A x w X b A x w X
w
w b B x w X X
  
    
    
   






 
 
Therefore, ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )b A x X b Bw x Xw   , since B is monotonically increasing. □ 
Lemma 3.2 implies that if a lottery has constant conditional expectation on the 
initial wealth, then the more risk averse decision maker will have a lower indifference 
buying price for the lottery than the less risk averse decision maker. Consequently, if a 
decision maker rejects the lottery, then any more risk averse decision maker will also 
reject it. Conversely, if a decision maker accepts the lottery, then any less risk averse 
decision maker will also accept it. 
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3.3.2. Monotonicity between Value of Information and Risk Aversion in Ross's 
Sense 
We now discuss the monotonicity between the value of information and risk 
aversion under assumption (A.2) or (A.3). If the decision maker accept the lottery, X, 
without the information, then the value of information, VOI VOIA ,  is defined in (3.3).   
Theorem 3.4: If two decision makers A  and B  both accept a lottery X without any 
further information, then the following two statements are equivalent: 
where AVOIA  and BVOIA are the value of information for A and B when they accept the 
lottery X without the information (respectively). 
Proof: (i)  (ii): We denote ( )wF w  as the marginal distribution of the initial 
wealth w and | ( | )X wF x w as the conditional distribution of the lottery X conditioning on 
the initial wealth w , then the joint distribution of X and w  , , ( , )X wF x w , is  
 , |
0
( , ) ( | ) ( )
w
X X ww wF x w F x t dF t  . 
For each [0,1]  , define ( )   as the unique solution to 
 
[(1 ) ( ( )) ( [ ( ))]
         [ ( )] [ ( )
)
].
( ]A
A
E A w X A w X E X
E A w X E A
V
a w X
       

     
  
 
 
 
Note that [ ( (0))(0) ]AV E A w X   , (1) [ ( (1))]AV E A w X 
   , we have 
(0) 0   and (1) [ ]Aa E X
 . In addition,  
(i) ( ) ( )SA Bx x  ; 
(ii) ( , ) . . [ | ] [ ]X w s t E X w E X   , A BVOIA VOIA ,  
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 
 
[(1 ) ( ( )) ( [ ( ))]
[ ( [ ( ))] [ ( ( ))]
( ) (1 ) [ ( ( ))] [ ( [ ( ))] .
( )
0 ]
  ]
  ]
A E A w X A w X E X
E A w X E X E A w X
E A w X E A
dV
X E X
d
w
d
     
 
   
       






       
 
 
    
       
 
Therefore, 
[ ( ( ))] [ ( [ ( ))]
( )
(1 ) [ ( ( ))] [ ( [ ( )] ]
]
)
E A w X E A w X E X
E A w X E A w X E X
   
 
     






    
  
      
. (3.25) 
Using the joint distribution , ( , )X wF x w , we can rewrite the numerator of (3.25) as 
0
0
0 0
0
|
]0 [
|
|
[ ( ( ))] [ ( [ ( ))]
{ ( ( )) ( [ ( ))}
{ ( ( )) ( [ (
]
] ( | ) ( )
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))}
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A w x A w E X d
A w x
F x w dF w
F x w dF wA w x E X d
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x E X
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A w s E X dsd
A w s E X dsd
A w s E X ds
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 
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

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0 0
( | ) ( ).X w wF x w F wd d
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  
 (3.26)
Since | ] ][ [E X w E X  , we have ] | ][ [E E X X w   and 
   |
0
|
0
0 ] ] | ]
   = ] ] (
( [ ( )) [ [
( [ ( )) [
     (
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] ] ( | )[ ( )) [
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X w
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  (3.27) 
Note that  
 
0
( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ))
b b s
a a
A w s A w ds A w t dsdt               .  (3.28) 
We can obtain that 
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 
[ ]
|
0
[
[ 0 0
]
]
|
][
( [ ( )) ( [ ( ))
( [ ( ))
] ] ( | )
] ( ,| )
E X
x E X
E X
x
w
E
X
X s
w
X
A w E X A w s E X dsd
A w t E X dtdsd
F x w
F x w
   
 





 






      
   
 
    (3.30)
 
and 
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Substitute (3.29), (3.30), (3.31) and (3.27) into (3.26), we have 
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Therefore, the numerator of (3.25) can be expressed as a summation of 
nonnegative weighted integrals of A . On the other hand, the denominator of (3.25) can 
be expressed as nonnegative weighted integrals of Aas follows, 
0
0
0
|
0 0
|
|
]
( | ) ( )
  ] ( | ) ( )
  
(1 ) [ ( ( ))] [ ( [ ( ))]
(1 ) ( ( ))
( [ ( ))
( ] ( | ) (( )) .[ )
X w
w
w
X w
X ww
E A w X E A w X E X
A w x
A w x
F x w dF w
F x w dF w
F x w dF
E X
A w E X w
     
  
  
  

 

 





       
   
 
 
  

 
 
   (3.33)
     
For each [0,1]  , define ( )   as the unique solution to 
 
 
(1 ) ( ( )) ( ( ))
     ( ) ) .
(
 (
)B
B
B w X B w X X
B w X B w X
V
a
      

          
 

    
 
Similar to the argument for ( )AV  , we know that (0) 0, (1) [ ]Ba E X 
  , and 
  ( ) ( ), [0,1]( )
( ) (
)
)
(
N A N
M M B
B
A
    
 
       
 
     
where ( )N   and ( )M   are defined as the right hand side of (3.32) and (3.33), respectively, 
and the last inequality is due to Machina and Neilson (1987). Since (0) (0) 0    , we 
know that [ (1] ]) (1) [BAa E X a E X 
    , i.e. A Ba a . 
(ii) (i): We want to show that if decision maker A values the information on all 
lotteries satisfying (A.3) higher than decision maker B when they both accept them, then 
decision maker A is more risk averse than decision maker B. Note that if decision maker 
A values the information on all lotteries satisfying (A.3) higher than decision maker B 
when they both accept them, then decision maker A values the information on a particular 
lottery with sufficiently small risk and satisfying (A.3)  higher than decision maker B 
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when they both accept it. So we shall show that if decision maker A values the 
information on a particular lottery with sufficiently small risk and satisfying (A.3) higher 
than decision maker B when they both accept the lottery, then decision maker A is more 
risk averse than decision maker B. Note that the value of information on such lottery is 
primarily determined by its lower order terms in the Taylor’s expansion on its risk. The 
higher value of information on such lottery exhibits higher primary terms (the first and 
second terms) than the lower one. We prove that (ii) implies (i) by comparing the 
Taylor’s expansion of the value of information on such lottery for the two decision 
makers.  
Consider the random initial wealth w  in figure 3.1 and suppose that the lottery X
is 
 
Figure 3.9. Conditional binary lottery with small risk. 
Note that the condition expectation of the potential loss on initial wealth, 
[ | ]E X w  is constant whatever the initial wealth is. Formally, 12[ | ] [ ]E X w E X
   . 
Moreover, if k is large enough, the potential gain of the lottery when initial wealth w x
is also sufficiently large such that both A and B will accept the lottery without the 
information. Therefore, ,, , , ,A Ba x y p ka   from (ii). From the definition of Aa , we 
have 
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
       
               if ,
       -
        
               if .
       -
k
w x
X
w y
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Differentiating both hand sides with respect to , we have 
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and 
   
0
1
2
Ada
d 
 . 
Differentiating A
da
d
with respect to again and fix 0 , we have 
 
2
2
0
(2 1) ( ) 3(1 ) ( )
4( ( ) (1 ) ( ))
Ad a p k A x p A y
d pA x p A y

   
 
  
. 
Since 0Aa   when 0 , the Taylor’s expansion of Aa  at 0 is 
 2
2 21
(2 1) ( ) 3(1 ) ( )
( )
4( ( ) (1 ) ( ))
A
p k A x p A y
a o
pA x p A y
   
  
  
,   (3.34) 
when is small. Similarly, the Taylor’s expansion of Aa  at 0 is 
 2
2 21
(2 1) ( ) 3(1 ) ( )
( )
4( ( ) (1 ) ( ))
B
p k B x p B y
a o
pB x p B y
   
  
  
.   (3.35) 
It follows that BAa a for all such lotteries and initial wealth only if ( , , ,x y p k ) 
(2 1) ( ) (1 ) ( ) (2 1) ( ) (1 ) ( )
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
p k A x p A y p k B x p B y
pA x p A y pB x p B y
        
  
      
. 
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If for some x , y and p ,  
 
( ) ( )
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
A x B x
pA x p A y pB x p B y
 
  
      
,  
then for k sufficiently large we have a contradiction. Hence ( , ,x y p ), 
( ) ( )
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
A x B x
pA x p A y pB x p B y
 
  
      
. 
If for some x  and y , 
( ) ( )
,
( ) ( )
A x B x
A y B y
 
  
 
then for p  sufficiently small we have a 
contradiction. Hence ( ,x y ), 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
A x B x
A y B y
 
  
 
, i.e. SA B  .   □ 
Theorem 3.4 shows that the more risk averse decision maker in Ross’s sense 
value the information on a lottery, whose potential loss has constant conditional 
expectation on the initial wealth higher than less risk averse one if they both accept the 
lottery without the information. No independent limitation on the potential gain is needed 
in such case. In addition, Theorem 3.4 also indicates the bounds on value of information 
for decision makers different risk attitudes. 
Corollary 3.3: If the potential gain of the lottery has constant conditional expectation on 
the initial wealth, i.e. [ ] [ ]|E X w E X  , then the value of information has the following 
bounds: 
(i) For any risk seeking decision maker, 0 ][VOI XE
  ; 
(ii) If a risk averse decision maker accepts the lottery X without the information, 
then [ ]VOIA E X  . 
Proof: (i) Since [ [ ]] [ ]w X w XE E X E    , 0 [ ]VOIA E X
 , where 0VOIA  
is 
the value of information for a risk neutral decision maker when he/she accept the lottery 
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without the information. Since [ | ] [ ]E wX E X   , 0VOIA VOIA  for any risk seeking 
decision maker due to Theorem 3.3. Since max{ , }VOI VOIA VOIR VOIA  , (i) holds. 
(ii) 0 [ ]VOIA VOIA E X
 
 
for any risk averse decision maker due to Theorem 
3.4.           □ 
Note that the bounds in Corollary 3.3 are independent of the potential gain of the 
lottery, though the value of information depends on both the potential gain and potential 
loss of the lottery when the decision maker accepts the lottery without the information. 
On the other hand, if the decision maker accept the lottery, X, without the 
information, then the value of information, VOI VOIR , is defined in (3.4). 
Theorem 3.5: If two decision makers A  and B  both reject a lottery X without any 
further information, the following two statements are equivalent: 
Proof: (i) (ii): If SA B  , then ( , ) ( , )A Br b A X b A X r
     due to Lemma 3.2, 
since ( , )VOIR b U X  . 
(ii)  (i): Again consider the random initial wealth w  in Figure 3.7 and the 
lottery X in Figure 3.8. Then the condition expectation of potential gain on random 
initial wealth, [ | ]E X w , is constant. More precisely, either w x or w y , 
1
2
[ | ]E X w  . Since the potential loss of the lottery X can be arbitrary larger by taking 
sufficiently large k , both decision maker A and B will reject the lottery without the 
(i) ( ) ( )SA Bx x  ; 
(ii) ( , ) . . [ | ] [ ]X w s t E X w E X   ,  A BVOIR VOIR , 
where AVOIR  and BVOIR are the value of information for A and B when they reject the 
lottery X without the information (respectively). 
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information when k is large enough. If (ii) holds,  then ,, , ,A B xr y pr  and sufficiently 
large k . Consider the Taylor’s expansions of Ar  and Br  at 0  in (3.17) and (3.18), we 
know that if BAr r for any such lottery and initial wealth, then ( ,x y ) 
(2 1) ( ) (2 1) ( )
.
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
p k A x p k B x
p A y p B y
  
  
  
 
Hence, 
( ) ( )
,
( )
,
( )
A x B
x
A
y
x
y B y
 


 

, i.e. SA B  .     □ 
Theorem 3.5 shows that the more risk averse decision maker in Ross’s sense 
value the information on a lottery, whose potential loss has constant conditional 
expectation on the initial wealth higher than less risk averse one if they both accept the 
lottery without the information. No independent limitation on the potential loss is needed 
since it does not appear in the definition of value of information in such case. In addition, 
Theorem 3.5 also indicates the bounds on value of information for decision makers 
different risk attitudes. 
Corollary 3.4: If the potential gain of the lottery has constant conditional expectation on 
the initial wealth, i.e. [ ] [ ]|E X w E X  , then the value of information has the following 
bounds: 
(i) For any risk seeking decision maker, 0 ][VOI XE
  ; 
(ii) If a risk averse decision maker accepts the lottery X without the information, 
then [ ]VOIA E X  . 
Proof: (i) Since [ [ ]] [ ]E E Xw wEX    , 0 [ ]VOIR E X
 , where 0VOIR is the 
value of information for a risk neutral decision maker when he/she accept the lottery 
without the information. Since [ | ] [ ]E wX E X   , 0VOIR VOIR  for any risk averse 
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decision maker due to Theorem 3.5. Since max{ , }VOI VOIA VOIR VOIR  , we obtain 
that (i) holds. 
(ii) 0 [ ]VOIR VOIR E X
 
 
for any risk seeking decision maker from Theorem 
3.2.           □ 
Moreover, all bounds in table 1 hold if both potential gain and potential loss of the 
lottery have constant conditional expectation on the initial wealth. Note that the 
conditional expectation of the lottery on the initial wealth is also constant in such settings. 
The decision maker who feels indifferent between accepting and rejecting the lottery 
without the information values the information higher than any more or less risk averse 
one in the Ross’s sense in such case due to Lemma 3.2 and Theorem 3.4 and 3.5. 
Theorem 3.6: If decision maker A is indifferent between accepting and rejecting a lottery 
X , which satisfies (A.2) and (A.3), without any further information, and if either of the 
following two conditions holds: 
then A BVOI VOI . Moreover, if [ ] 0E X  , then [ ] [ ]VOI E X E X
    for any risk 
averse or risk seeking decision maker.  
Proof: If [ | ] [ ]E wX E X    and [ | ] [ ]E wX E X   , then [ | ] [ ]XwE X E . If 
A S B  , then decision maker B will accept the lottery, X, without the information due to 
lemma 3.2.  Since [ | ] [ ]E wX E X   , A A B BVOI VOIA VOIA VOI   due to Theorem 
3.4. If A S B  , then decision maker B will reject the lottery, X, without the information 
due to lemma 3.2. Since [ | ] [ ]E wX E X   , A A B BVOI VOIR VOIR VOI   due to 
(i) ( ) ( )SA Bx x   
or 
(ii)  ( ) ( )SA Bx x  ,  
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Theorem 3.5. Moreover, if [ ] 0E X  , then [ ] [ ]VOI E X E X    for any risk averse or 
risk seeking decision maker due to Corollaries 3.3 and 3.4.    □ 
3.4. Summary and Related Work 
We extend our discussion on the two-action decision problem to uncertain initial 
wealth case. We reveal that the different measures of risk aversion are applied for 
different assumptions on the initial wealth. If the assumptions on the initial wealth are 
weaker, then the corresponding measure of risk aversion needs to be stronger. More 
precisely, we consider the deterministic initial wealth and the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion 
functions in chapter 2 and show that if two decision makers with the same deterministic 
initial wealth both accept the lottery without the information, then the more risk averse 
decision maker values the information higher than the less risk averse decision maker. 
Conversely, if two decision makers with the same deterministic initial wealth both reject 
the lottery without the information, then the less risk averse decision maker values the 
information higher than the more risk averse decision maker. Note that the more risk 
averse decision maker with deterministic initial wealth has lower indifferent buying price 
than the less risk averse decision maker with the same initial wealth. The decision maker 
who is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the lottery without the information 
values the information higher than any other decision maker with more risk aversion or 
less risk aversion in the deterministic intial wealth.   
However, if the initial wealth is uncertain, then we pose an example (see example 
3.1) to show that neither the indifferent buying price nor the value of information is 
monotone to risk aversion given the knowledge of the decision without the information. 
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To capture the monotonicity between the risk aversion and the value of information, we 
introduce Rubinstein’s measure as follows (see Rubinstein 1973). 
Definition (Rubinstein’s measure of risk aversion, Rubinstein 1973) 
AU  
is more risk averse than 
BU  in the Rubinstein’s sense if and only if 
   ( ) ( ),A BR R W WW   ,    (3.36) 
where 
[ ( )]
( )
[ ( )]
A
A
A
E U W
R W
E U W



and 
[ ( )]
( )
[ ( )]
B
B
B
E U W
R W
E U W



are the Rubinstein’s risk aversion 
functions of AU  and BU  over the final wealth W , which is deterministic or uncertain,  
respectively. 
We show that if two decision makers with the same uncertain initial wealth accept 
an independent lottery without the information, then the more risk averse decision maker 
values the information higher than the less risk averse decision maker in the Rubinstein’s 
sense. (See Theorem 3.1) Conversly, if two decision makers with the same uncertain 
initial wealth reject an independent lottery without the information, then the less risk 
averse decision maker values the information higher than the more risk averse decision 
maker in Rubinstein’s sense. (See Theorem 3.2). Note that the more risk averse decision 
maker with uncertain initial wealth has lower indifferent buying price for an independent 
lottery than the less risk averse decision maker with the same initial wealth. (See Lemma 
3.1) The decision maker who feels indifferent between accepting and rejecting the lottery 
without the information values the information higher than any other decision maker 
having lower or higher risk aversion in Rubinstein’s sense. (See Theorem 3.3) 
Moreover, Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 also indicate that Rubinstein’s measure of risk 
aversion is the weakest measure which preserves the monotonicity between risk aversion 
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and the value of information when the lottery is independent of the initial wealth. 
However, Rubinstein’s measure of risk aversion does not work when the lottery is not 
independent of the uncertain initial wealth. (See Example 3.6) However, if the 
conditional expectation of the potential loss (or potential gain) on the initial wealth is 
constant, then the value of information is monotone to risk aversion in Ross's sense, 
which is stronger than Rubinstein's sense. Formally,  
Definition (Ross’s measure of risk aversion, Machina and Neilson 1987) 
AU  
is more risk averse than BU in the Ross’s sense, SA B  , if and only if  
    
( ) ( )
,
( )
,
( )B
A
A
BU x U x
U y
x y
U y
 


  

.  
We prove the monotonicity between risk aversion in Ross’s sense and the value of 
information on the lottery with constant conditional expectation of its potential loss over 
the accept region. (See Theorem 3.4) Coversely, the monotonicity between the value of 
information and risk aversion in Ross’s sense over the reject region needs the assumption 
that the conditional expectation of the potential gain of the lottery on the initial wealth is 
constant. (See Theorem 3.5) Finally, if the conditional expectation of the potential gain 
and the potential loss of the lottery are both constant, then the decision maker who is 
indifferent bwteen accepting and rejecting the lottery will value the information higher 
than any other decision maker with lower or higher risk aversion in Ross’s sense. (See 
Theorem 3.6)  
Our discussion in Chapters 2 and 3 shows that the different assumptions on the 
initial wealth of the decision maker need different measures or risk aversion to guarrantte 
the monotonicity between risk aversion and value of information when two decision 
makers both accept or reject the lottery without the information. The stronger measure of 
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risk aversion is corresponding to the more general settings on the intial wealth. More 
precisely, the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion works for deterministic initial wealth 
case. However, Rubinstein’s measure of risk aversion is needed when the initial wealth is 
independent of the lottery. Finally, Ross’s measure of risk aversion applies for the lottery 
with constant conditional expectation of its potential gain or potential loss on initial 
wealth. We summarizes the different measures of risk aversion for monotonicity of value 
of information with different assumptions on initial wealth in the following table. 
        Optimal decision 
Initial wealth 
Accept without information Reject without information 
Deterministic 
( ) ( )
,
( ) ( )
A
A B
B
B
A
U x U x
U x U
x
VOI A
x
A VOI

  
 
 

   
( ) ( )
,
( ) ( )
A
A B
B
B
A
U x U x
U x U
x
VOI R
x
R VOI

  
 
 

   
Independent of lottery 
[ ( )] [ ( )]
,
[ ( )] [ ( )]
A
A
A
B
B
B
E U W E U W
E U W E U W
W
VOIA VOIA
  




 
   
[ ( )] [ ( )]
,
[ ( )] [ ( )]
A
A
A
B
B
B
E U W E U W
E U W E U W
W
VOIR VOIR
  




 
   
Dependent on lottery  
If [ | ] [ ], then
( ) ( )
,
(
,
) ( )
A
A
A B
B
B
E X E X
U x U x
U y U
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
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Table 3.2. Measures of Risk Aversion for monotonicity of value of information with 
different assumptions on initial wealth. 
Note that any risk averse or risk seeking decision maker in the Arrow-Pratt sense 
is also a risk averse or risk seeking decision maker in Rubinstein’s sense and Ross’s 
sense and vice verse, we obtain the same upper and lower bounds for any risk averse or 
risk seeking decision maker with different assumptions on initial wealth in this chapter. 
(See table 3.1.) 
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Our results in the uncertain initial wealth settings can directly extend to a two-
action decision problem, where the decision maker needs to choose one from two 
uncertain lotteries, 
1X and 2X  instead of deciding whether or not buying one lottery. 
Formally, Suppose a decision maker with deterministic initial wealth, w , faces two 
uncertain lotteries 
1X and 2X .  We can assume that the initial wealth of the decision 
maker is equal to his/her initial wealth, w  plus the first lottery, 1X , i.e. 1w w X   and 
two alternatives become accepting or rejecting the new lottery 2 1X X X   . His/her 
decision tree without the information is as shown in Figure 3.10. 
 
 
Figure 3.10. Decision trees for facing two lotteries without the information. 
In particular, we denote S to be the indicator such that 1S   if 1 2X X  and 
0S  , otherwise. Figure 3.11 shows the equivalent decision trees after acquiring the 
information S at some cost c.  
w
w X2
Choose X
1Choose X
1w X
2w X
2Choose X
1Choose X
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Figure 3.11. Decision trees for facing two lotteries after acquiring the information. 
The value of such information isn’t monotone with the risk aversion in general 
cases. Hilton (1981) posed an example for the power utility class with two lotteries. The 
joint distribution of the two lotteries is binary with equal probability in his example. He 
showed that the value of information which indicates the order of the outcomes of these 
two lotteries is not monotone with respect to the relative risk aversion. However, if we 
assume that the difference of two lotteries is independent of one of these lotteries, for 
example, if 2 1X X  is independent of 1X , we can apply the arguments in section 3.3 
with the equivalent uncertain initial wealth 1w w X   and the equivalent lottery
2 1X X X  .  
1S
0S
1w X c
2w X c
1Choose X
2Choose X
1Choose X
2Choose X
1w X c
2w X c
1S
0S
1Choose X
2Choose X
1Choose X
2Choose X
w c
w X c
w c
w X c
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CHAPTER 4 
EFFECTS OF LOTTERY ON MONOTONICITY OF VALUE OF 
INFORMATION  
We now consider the effects of the lottery on the monotonicity between the value 
of information and risk aversion in the two-action decision problem. All utility functions 
in this chapter are strictly increasing and second order differentiable. This chapter is 
organized as follows. We introduce the definition of stochastic dominance in section 4.1. 
We show the effects of stochastic dominance on the value of information in the two-
action decision problem in section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents the effects of stochastic 
dominance on the monotonicity between risk aversion and the value of information in the 
two-action decision problem. We summarize our main results in this chapter in section 
4.4. 
4.1. Introduction of Stochastic Dominance  
Hadar and Russell (1969) introduced the (first order) stochastic dominance to 
compare indifferent buying price of the lotteries for decision makers with monotonically 
increasing utility functions. Formally, 
Definition (Hadar and Russell 1969)  
Lottery X  first order stochastically dominants (FSD) lotteryY , i.e.
1S
X Y  if and only if  
    ( ) ( ),X YF Fx x x  ,    (4.1) 
where XF and YF are the cumulative distribution functions of the lotteries X and Y , 
respectively. 
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 Hadar and Russell (1969) showed that if lottery X first order stochastic dominants 
lottery Y , then any decision maker with a monotonically increasing utility function 
prefer to X when facing both lotteries and vise verse. More precisely, denote 
( ( ), )b U x w X and ( ( ), )b U x w Y as the indifferent buying price of lotteries X and Y , 
respectively.  
Proposition (Hadar and Russell 1969)  
1S
X Y if and only if
 
( ( ), ) ( ( ), ),b U x w X b U x w Y    for all monotonically increasing 
U. 
Since the first stochastic dominance defines a unique ordering on the lotteries 
according to the preference of all decision makers with increasing utility functions. We 
can call lottery X  is better than lottery Y if X  (first order) stochastic dominants Y
without any confusion. Two problems arise with respect to the effects of the lottery on 
the value of information in the two-action decision problem. Whether all decision makers 
value the information on the better lottery higher than the information on the worse 
lottery in the two-action decision problems with two distinct lotteries, respectively? If the 
more risk averse decision maker values the information on a lottery higher (or lower) 
than the less risk averse decision maker, then whether he/she will value the information 
on a better lottery higher (or lower) than the less risk averse decision maker. More 
precisely, we consider the monotonicity between the lottery and the value of information 
on it in the two-action decision problem for decision makers with different risk attitude in 
section 4.2. We consider the effects of the lottery on the monotonicity between risk 
aversion and the value of information in section 4.3. 
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Note that the decomposition of any given lottery in chapter 2 is crucial in the 
value of information in the two-action decision problem. We can show that if a lottery 
stochastically dominants another lottery, then their components in such decomposition 
holds such ordering in different directions as well. Formally, the following Lemma will 
be useful in our discussion on the effects of the lottery on the monotonicity between risk 
aversion and the value of information in the two-action decision problem. 
Lemma 4.1: The following two conditions are equivalent: 
Proof: Denote
X
F  , XF  , YF  and YF  are the cumulative distribution functions of 
the lotteries X  , X  , Y  andY  , respectively.  
(i) (ii): If 
1S
X Y , then (F( ) ),X YF x x x  . Note that X

, X  , Y  and Y  are 
all positive, we obtain that ( ) ( ) ( ) 0( ) 0,
X X Y Y
F x F x F x F x x        . On the other 
hand, If 0x  , then ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
X Y
F x P X x P X x P Y x P Y x F x 
          . 
Hence, 
1S
X Y   . In the meanwhile, if 0x  , then ( ) ( ) ( )
X
F x P X x P X x
    
1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
Y
P X x P Y x F x         . Hence, 
1S
Y X  . 
(ii) (i): If 
1S
X Y  , then 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),X YX Y xF x F x F x F x     . Moreover, 
if 
1S
Y X  , then 0( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ),X YX Y xF x F x F x F x        . Hence, 1SX Y .□ 
(i) 
1S
X Y ; 
(ii) 
1S
X Y   and 
1S
Y X  . 
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4.2. Effects of Stochastic Dominance on the Monotonicity of Value of Information  
We now consider a decision maker having a utility function, U , and deterministic 
initial wealth, w ,  is facing either lottery X or lottery Y . Denote ( )VOI X  and ( )VOI Y  
be the value of information on X  and Y , respectively. If the decision maker rejects the 
better lottery without the information, then he/she will reject the worse lottery without the 
information as well. Moreover, the following theorem holds. 
Theorem 4.1: If the decision maker rejects the lottery X without the information and if
1S
X Y , then ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )VOI X VOIR X VOIR Y VOI Y   , where ( )VOIR X  and ( )VOIR Y  
are the value of information on X  and Y  when the decision maker rejects them without 
the information, respectively. 
Proof: Since the decision maker rejects the lottery X without the information, we know 
that ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X  . Since
1S
X Y , ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) 0b U x w Y b U x w X    (see Hadar 
and Russell, 1969). Hence, the decision maker rejects lottery Y without the information.  
Comparing the definitions of value of information when rejecting without the information 
and indifferent buying price, we have ( ) ( ) ( ( ), )VOI X VOIR X b U x w X    
( ( ), ) ( ) ( )b U x w Y VOIR Y VOI Y   , since X Y
   due to Lemma 4.1.   □ 
Theorem 4.1 indicates that value of information is monotonically decreasing with 
respect to the lotteries in the reject region, where the decision maker’s optimal decision 
without the information is rejecting the lottery. However, the value of information is not 
monotone with respect to the lotteries if the decision maker accepts these lotteries 
without the information.  
  
 84 
 
Theorem 4.2: If the decision maker accepts the lottery Y without the information, then 
Proof: (i) If  
1S
Y X   and if X Y  , then 
1S
X Y . Note that the decision 
maker accepts the lottery Y without the information, we know ( ( ), )b U x w X 
( ( ), ) 0b U x w Y  .  Therefore, the decision maker accepts the lottery X  without the 
information. In addition, 
 
[ ( ( ))] [ ( ( ))]
                                        [ (
                                        [ (
        
)]
                               
)]
 [ ( (
E U w X VOIA Y E U w Y VOIA Y
E U w Y
E U w X
E U w X VO
Y
X
IA
 
 
 

  



 
 



 ))].X
 
Therefore, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )VOI X VOIA X VOIA Y VOI Y   .    □ 
(ii) If
1S
X Y   and if X Y  , then 
1S
X Y . Note that the decision maker 
accepts the lottery Y without the information, we know that ( ( ), )b U x w X 
( ( ), ) 0b U x w Y  .  Hence, the decision maker accepts the lottery X  without the 
information. 
Since 
1S
X Y  , X Y  , there exists positive lottery 0Z   such that 
X Y Z  with 0Z  when 0Y  .  Denote | ( | )Z YF z y  as the conditional distribution of 
Z  on Y .  
(i) If 
1S
Y X  and X Y  , then ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )VOI X VOIA X VOIA Y VOI Y   ;   
(ii) If 
1S
X Y  , X Y  and if ,( ) 0U xx   , then ( ) ( )VOI X VOIA X 
( ) ( )VOIA Y VOI Y , 
where ( )VOIA X  and ( )VOIA Y  are the value of information on X  and Y  when  the 
decision maker accepts them without the information, respectively. 
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The inequality is due to the fact that ,( ) 0U xx    and that ( ) 0, xU x   .  Note that U is 
monotonically increasing, ( ) ( )U UVOI X VOI Y .     □ 
Lemma 4.1 shows that the conditions on two lotteries X  and Y  in Theorem 4.2 
(i) or (ii) indicate that X stochastically dominants Y . However, the value of information 
on the better lottery is higher than the value of information on the worse lottery under the 
conditions in Theorem 4.2 (i) and the opposite relationship holds under the conditions in 
Theorem 4.2 (ii) for any risk averse decision maker. The following example illustrates 
these results. 
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Example 4.1: 
Consider an exponential utility decision maker with initial wealth 200w  and 
risk aversion 0.01  . Let X be a binary lottery with outcomes  and -50 with equal 
probability for any given [0,300]  and let Y  be a binary lottery with outcomes  and 
50 with equal probability for any given [ 100,0]   . Then 
2 1 1S
X X 
   and
21
X X 
  ,
1 20 300     ; 1 2Y Y 
   and 
1 12 S
Y Y 
  , 1 2100 0     . Figure 4.1 plots their 
indifferent buying price and value of information over both accept and reject region. 
 
Figure 4.1. (a) indifferent buying price across zero at 104.6175C  ; (b) value of 
information increases with  ; (c) indifferent buying price across zero at 88.1797C   ; 
(d) value of information decreases with  . 
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 Figure 4.1 (a) plots the indifferent buying price versus the possible gain,  , and 
shows that the indifferent buying price is monotonically increasing with  , which is 
predicted by Hadar and Russell  (1969) since the lottery with larger  stochastically 
dominants the lottery with smaller  . It also indicates that the indifferent buying price is 
across zero at 104.6175C   . Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 (i) predict that the value of 
information is monotonically increasing with  . It is indeed the case shown in Figure 4.1 
(b). Moreover, Figure 4.1. (b) also shows that the value of information changes its shape 
at C  since the decision maker changes his/her optimal decision without the information 
for the lotteries in its different sides. On the other hand, Figure 4.1 (c) indicates that the 
indifferent buying price is monotonically increasing with the possible loss,  . Since the 
potential gain, Y

 are constant for all   in its domain, the value of information is also 
constant in reject region, i.e. 100 33.1797C      . However, Theorem 4.2. (ii) 
predicts that the value of information is monotonically decreasing with  . It is indeed 
the case shown in Figure 4.1. (d). 
Delquie (2008) proved that the increment in expected utility from the information 
is monotonically decreasing with the decision maker’s intensity of preference. As a 
special case, the decision maker values the information highest among all lotteries when 
he/she feels indifferent between accepting and rejecting the lottery without the 
information. However, Figure 4.1 (b) indicates that it is not the case for indifferent 
buying price of the information. Moreover, Theorem 4.2 also indicates that the value of 
information on the better lottery may be higher or lower than the value of information on 
the worse lottery depending on the improvement between two lotteries lies on their 
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positive part or negative part when the decision maker is risk averse. The following 
example illustrates this result. 
Example 4.2: 
Again consider the decision maker in example 4.1. Let the original lottery,
0X , is 
binary distributed with two random outcomes 0 and -50 having even probability. If the 
possible gain and the possible loss of the lottery is monotonically improved alternatively, 
then the lottery also becomes better and better. More precisely, the possible gain is 
monotonically increasing from 0 to 300 given the possible loss is fixing at -50 in the first 
step. Secondly, the possible loss is monotonically changing from -50 to -30 and the 
possible gain is always 300. Then the possible gain is monotonically increasing from 300 
to 600 for the fixing possible loss at -30. Finally, only the possible loss is monotonically 
increasing from -30 to 0. Figure 4.2 plots the possible gain, possible loss and the value of 
information. 
 
Figure 4.2. (a) the possible gain and possible loss increases alternatively; (b) Value of 
information increases and decreases alternatively 
Figure 4.2 (a) plots the changes in the possible gain and possible loss of the 
lotteries under consideration. Though the improvement may happens in either the 
possible gain or the possible loss, the underline lottery always becomes better and better. 
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Theorem 4.1 predicts that the value of information is monotonically increasing with the 
change of the lottery when the decision maker rejects the lottery without the information. 
Theorem 4.2 predicts that the value of information increases and decreases alternatively 
when the possible gain and the possible loss are improved alternatively. It is indeed the 
case shown in Figure 4.2. (b). 
Example 4.2 shows that monotonicity between the lottery and the value of 
information does not hold for any risk averse decision maker in the two-action decision 
problem. However, it does hold for any risk seeking or risk neutral decision maker. 
Theorem 4.3: If a risk seeking or risk neutral decision maker accept the lottery Y without 
the information and if 
1S
X Y , then ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )VOI X VOIA X VOIA Y VOI Y   . 
Proof: Since the decision maker accepts the lottery Y without the information, we 
know that ( ( ), ) 0b U x w Y  . Since
1S
X Y , ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X b U x w Y    . Hence, 
the decision maker rejects lottery Y without the information. I.e. ( ) ( )VOI X VOIA X and
( ) ( )VOI Y VOIA Y .  
We now prove that ( ) ( )VOIA X VOIA Y . From the definitions of ( )VOIA X and 
( )VOIA Y , we know that 
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  (4.2) 
Since
1S
X Y , there exists 0Z  such that X Y Z  . Denote ( )YF y  to be the 
distribution of Y . Let | ( | )Z YF z y  be the conditional distribution of Z  on Y .  
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The first inequality is due to the monotonic increasing of U  , since ( ) 0,U x x   . 
Second inequality is because y is negative in the integral. In addition, 
 
 
 
0
0
|
0
0
|
0
( ) ( ( )) ( )
( ( )) ( ( )) ( | )
( ) ( ( )) ( | ) ( )
X
y
Z Y Y
y
Z Y Y
U w x U w VOIA Y dF x
U w y z U w VOIA Y dF z y dF
U w y U w VOIA Y dF z y
y
F yd





 
   
 

 


 
 
  (4.4) 
Substitute (4.3) and (4.4) into (4.2), we have 
[ ( ( ))] [ ( ( ))]
[ ( )] [ ( ( ))] 0
E U w X VOIA X E U w X VOIA Y
E U Aw Y E U w Y VOI Y
 

  
  

 

  (4.5) 
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Since U is monotonically increasing, we have ( ) ( )VOIA X VOIA Y .  □ 
  Theorem 4.3 indicates that the value of information on the better lottery is lower 
than the value of information on the worse lottery if the risk seeking decision maker 
accepts both lotteries without the information.  
In particular, if a risk seeking decision maker feels indifferent between accepting 
and rejecting a lottery without the information, then he/she will accept (or reject) any 
better (or worse) lottery without the information due to Hadar and Russell’s Proposition.  
Theorem 4.4: If a risk seeking decision maker feels indifferent between accepting or 
rejecting the lottery X without the information, and if either of the following two 
conditions holds: 
(i) 
1S
X Y or 
(ii) 
1S
Y X ; 
then ( ) ( )VOI X VOI Y . 
Proof: Since the risk seeking decision maker feels indifferent between accepting 
and rejecting the lottery X without the information, we know that ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X   and 
that ( )VOI X  ( ) ( )VOIA X VOIR X . If
1S
X Y , then ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )b U x w Y b U x w X    
0  and ( )VOI Y  ( ) ( ) ( )VOIR Y VOIR X VOI X   due to Theorem 4.1. If
1S
X Y , then 
( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) 0b U x w Y b U x w X      and ( )VOI Y  ( ) ( ) ( )VOIA Y VOIA X VOI X   due 
to Theorem 4.3.          □ 
Theorem 4.4 implies that if the risk seeking decision maker feels indifferent 
between accepting and rejecting the lottery without the information, then he/she values 
the information on such lottery higher than any either better or worse lotteries.  
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4.3. Effects of Risk Aversion on Value of information for Different Lotteries 
We now consider the effects of the lottery on the monotonicity between risk 
aversion and value of information in the two-action decision problem. We again consider 
two decision makers A and B in chapter 2. However, they may face either lottery X or 
lottery Y now. Denote ( )AVOI X and ( )BVOI X as the value of information on lottery X for 
decision makers A and B, respectively. And denote ( )AVOI Y and ( )BVOI Y as the value of 
information on lottery Y for decision makers A and B, respectively. Similarly, we also 
indicate the lottery in the brace for the value of information for decision makers A and B 
when they accept or reject the lottery without the information. 
Theorem 4.5: If ( ) 0B x   and if ( ) ( ),A B xx x    
Proof: (i) If ( ( ), ) 0Ab U x w X  , then ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) 0B Ab U x w X b U x w X    , 
since ( ) ( ),A B xx x    . Therefore, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )B B A AVOI X VOIA X V IA X XVOIO   due 
to Theorem 2.3, which is a contradition. Hence, we obtain that ( ( ), ) 0Ab U x w X  . 
Since
1S
X Y , ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) 0A Ab U x w Y b U x w X    . If ( ( ), ) 0Bb U x w Y  , then 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )A A B BVOI Y VOIA Y VOIA Y VOI Y    
from Theorem 2.4. If ( ( ), ) 0Bb U x w Y  , 
then ( ( ), ) 0Bb U x w X  and ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )BA BAVOI Y VOI X V XOI VOI Y   due to Theorems 
4.1 and 4.3. 
(ii) If ( ( ), ) 0Bb U x w X  , then ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) 0A Bb U x w X b U x w X    , since
( ) ( ),A B xx x   . Hence, we obtain that ( ) ( )A BV X VOIOI X from Theorem 2.4, which 
(i) If ( ) ( )A BV X VOIOI X , then 1( ) ( ),A SBVOI Y s.t. XVOI Y Y Y   ; 
(ii) If ( ) ( )A BV X VOIOI X , then 1( ) ( ),A B SVOI VOI YY Y X   . 
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is a contradiction. Therefore, we know that ( ( ), ) 0Bb U x w X  . Since 1SY X , we know 
that ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) 0B Bb U x w Y b U x w X    . If ( ( ), ) 0Bb U x w Y  , then ( )AVOI Y 
( ) ( ) ( )A B BVOIA Y VOIA Y VOI Y  due to Theorem 2.3. If ( ( ), ) 0Bb U x w Y  ,  then 
( ( ), ) 0Bb U x w X   
and
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )BA BAVOI Y VOI X V XOI VOI Y   due to Theorems 
4.1 and 4.3.          □ 
We consider two decision makers under the assumption that at least one of them 
is risk seeking or risk neutral. Theorem 4.5 implies that if the more risk averse decision 
maker values the information on a lottery higher than the less risk averse decision maker, 
then the more risk averse decision maker also values the information on any better lottery 
higher than less risk averse decision maker. Conversely, if the less risk averse decision 
maker values the information on a lottery higher than more risk averse decision maker, 
then the less risk averse decision maker also values the information on any worse lottery 
higher than more risk averse decision maker.  
Theorem 4.6: Assume that ( ) 0B x   and that ( ) ( ),A B xx x   . If ( ) ( )BAV XOI VOI X , 
then 
Proof: (i) Since ( ) ( ) 0,B Ax x x    , we know that ( ( ), )Ab U x w X 
( ( ), )Bb U x w X . If ( ( ), ) 0Bb U x w X  , then two decision makers will both reject the 
lottery X and ( )AVOI X  ( ) ( ) ( )A B BVOIA X VOIA X VOI X   from Theorem 2.4, which 
is a contradiction. If ( ( ), ) 0Ab U x w X  , then two decision makers will both accept the 
(i)  ( ( ), ) 0 ( ( ), )A Bb U x w X b U x w X    ; 
(ii) 
1
( ) ( ),A SBVOI Y s.t. XVOI Y Y Y   ; 
(iii) 
1
( ) ( ),BA SVOI VOI YY Y X   . 
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lottery X and ( ) ( ) ( )A A BVOI X VOIA X VOIA X  ( )BVOI X  from Theorem 2.3, which 
is a contradiction. Therefore, we obtain that ( ( ), ) 0 ( ( ), )A Bb U x w X b U x w X    . 
(ii) From Theorem 4.5. (i). 
(iii) From Theorem 4.5. (ii).        □ 
We consider two decision makers facing some lotteries once each time in the two-
action problem under the assumption that at least one of them is risk seeking or risk 
neutral. If the more risk averse decision maker value the information on some lotteries 
higher than the less risk averse decision maker and if the opposite relationship hold for 
other lotteries, then Theorems 4.5 and 4.6 imply that the more risk averse decision maker 
values the information on the better lotteries higher than the less risk averse decision 
maker. Conversely, the less risk averse risk averse decision maker values the information 
on the worse lotteries higher than the more risk averse decision maker. Moreover, if the 
decision makers value the information on a lottery equally, then the more risk averse 
decision maker rejects the lottery without the information and the less risk averse 
decision maker accepts it without the information. The following example illustrates 
these results. 
Example 4.3: 
We consider two decision makers A and B  with the deterministic initial wealth, 
200w  , and having utility functions 0.001( ) xAU x e and 
2( )BU x x , respectively. Direct 
calculation shows that 1( ) 0.001 ( ) 0B Axx x       , [50,350]x  . Suppose they 
both face a lottery in a group of lotteries,{ }X , with a parameter [ 50,a  50] , which is 
a scaled Beta distributed on the interval [$ 100,$ 100]a a   with parameters, 2r  , 2k  , 
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i.e. ( 100, 100,2,2)aX Beta a a  . Direct calculation shows that the expectation of the 
lottery, 
aX , [ ]E X a  and that 1 1 2 1 2,a S a aX X a  . Figure 4.3 plots the indifferent 
buying price of the lottery
aX  and value of information on it for decision makers A  and 
B , where Ac  and Bc  are the critical point at which decision maker A and B  feel 
indifferent between accepting and rejecting such lottery without the information, and 
where AVOI and BVOI are value of information on the lottery, aX , for A and B  with their 
maxima denoted by max{ }AVOI  and max{ }BVOI , respectively. In addition, Ca  and 
( )CVOI X  satisfy ( ) ( ) ( )A a B a CVOI X VOI X VOI X    when Ca a .  
 
Figure 4.3. (a) Indifferent buying price for A (or B ) across zero at 1.0004Ac    (or
19.0887Bc   ); (b) Value of information for A is lower (or higher) than value of 
information for B when Ca a ( Ca a ) with 14.3487Ca   .  
Figure 4.3 (a) plots the indifferent buying price of the lotteries in { }X  for 
decision makers A  and B  and shows that they are both monotonically increasing with a , 
which is predicted by Hadar and Russell’s Lemma since the lottery with greater a  
stochastically dominates the lottery with smaller a .  It also indicates that both indifferent 
buying price are across zero at 1.0004Ac   and 19.0887Bc    with A Bc c , 
respectively. Figure 4.3 (b) plots the value of information on the lotteries for in { }X  for 
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decision makers A  and B . Theorem 4.6 predicts that that ,B aAVOI VOI X  with 
Ca a and that ,B aAVOI VOI X  with Ca a . Theorem 4.6 also implies that decision 
maker A  will reject aX  and decision maker B  will accept it without the information 
when 
Ca a . It is indeed the case shown in Figure 4.3 (b). 
Moreover, Eeckhoudt and Godfroid (2000) compared the value of information for 
a risk averse decision maker and a risk neutral decision maker in the “newsboy problem”. 
They assumed that two newsboys with deterministic initial wealth, which contained in 
their utility functions, are deciding whether to buy 50 units of newspaper at price 15 or 
not. The uncertain demand of the news paper is either 0 with probability p  or 50 with 
probability1 p , which produces a net profit of 35.  They proved that there exist a unique 
critical probability Ap for any risk averse decision maker and the risk neutral decision 
maker such that the value of information for the risk averse decision maker, AI , is greater 
(or less) than the value of information for the risk neutral maker, NI , if Ap p (or Ap p ). 
Note that the investment with lower the probability of zero demand stochastically 
dominates the investment with higher such probability. Their conclusion is a special case 
of Theorem 4.6. 
4.4. Summary 
We consider the effects of the improvement of the lottery in the stochastic 
dominance sense on the value of information in the two-action decision problem. Hadar 
and Russell (1969) introduced the (first order) stochastic dominance as follows. 
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Definition (Hadar and Russell) Lottery X  first order stochastically dominants (FSD) 
lotteryY , i.e.
1S
X Y  if and only if  
    ( ) ( ),X YF Fx x x  ,    (4.6) 
where XF and YF are the cumulative distribution functions of the lotteries X and Y , 
respectively. 
We show that if a lottery X stochastically dominates lottery Y , then the value of 
information on X is higher than the value of information on Y when the decision maker 
rejec both lotteries without the information in the two-action decision problems with 
either of them. (See Theorem 4.1) Conversly, if the decision maker accepts both lotteries 
without the information, then the better potential loss in the stochastic dominance sense 
offers the higher value of information for any decision maker and the better potential gain 
in the stochastic dominance sense produces the lower value of information for any risk 
averse decision maker. (See Theorem 4.2) Theorem 4.2 indicates that the monotonicity 
between the lotteries in the stochastic dominance sense and the value of information does 
not hold in accept region for any risk averse decision maker. However, it does hold for 
any risk seeking or risk neutral decision maker. (See Theorem 4.3) 
Finally, the value of information on the lottery, which makes a risk seeking or risk 
neutral decision maker feels indifferent between accepting and rejecting without the 
information, is higher than the value of infomraitn on any other better or worse lottery in 
stochastic dominance sense. (See Theorem 4.4) 
We also show that if one of two decision makers is risk seeking or risk neutral and 
if the more risk averse (or less risk averse) decision maker values the information on a 
lottery higher than the less risk averse (or more risk averse) decision maker, the same 
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inequality holds for any better (or worse) lottery in stochastic dominance sense. (See 
Theorem 4.5) 
In particular, if two decision makers with the same settings in Theorem 4.5 value 
the information on a lottery identical, then the more risk averse decision maker value the 
information on any better (or worse) lottery higher (or lower) than the the less risk averse 
decision maker. (See Theorem 4.6) 
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CHAPTER 5 
MONOTONICITY OF VALUE OF INFORMATION ON SETS 
We now consider the value of imperfect information, which indicates whether the 
random outcome of the lottery lies in some mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive sets, in the two-action decision problem. All utility functions in this chapter 
are strictly increasing and second order differentiable. This chapter is organized as 
follows. We introduce the value of imperfect information on sets in section 5.1. We 
consider the information on intervals and proof that if two decision makers both accept 
the lottery without the information, then the more risk averse decision maker will value 
the information on intervals higher than the less risk averse decision maker in sections 
5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 for different types of endpoints. More precisely, section 5.2 presents the 
intervals with all positive endpoints. Section 5.3 presents the intervals with all negative 
endpoints and section 5.4 presents the intervals with any endpoints. We summarize our 
main results in section 5.5. 
5.1. Problem Formulation 
We again consider the two-action decision problem with deterministic initial 
wealth in chapter 2. Instead of the perfect information (or its equivalent as discussed in 
Chapter 2), the decision maker now has the opportunity to obtain extra information on the 
lottery with some cost, c, by observing a random signal, S , which indicates whether the 
lottery, X , is in some disjoint sets. Formally, suppose 1 2{ , ,..., }kA A A is a partition of all 
possible outcomes of the lottery, X . I.e. the sets, iA , are mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive. Then S is a simple function, which is a weighted summation of 
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some indicate functions on 
iA , i.e. 
1
( )i
k
i
i
AS a I X

 ,where ,i ja a i j   , I is an 
indicate function. Therefore, iS a , if and only if iX A . For example, if 1 (0 ),A   , 
2 ,0( ]A   , 1 1a  and 2 0a  , then such information is the perfect information in 
Chapter 2.  
 Given the information is perfect, any decision maker with increasing utility 
function will accept the lottery if the perfect information indicates that 0X  and reject it 
otherwise. However, decision makers with different utility functions may make different 
decisions given the same observation of the random signal, S, if it is not perfect. More 
precisely, suppose that the information, S , at some cost c indicates that the random 
outcome of the lottery, X , is in some set jA . Then the decision maker is facing 
truncation of the original lottery, X , on jA , jX . However, if (0, )jA    and jA
( ,0)  , then the decision maker will accept the lottery if and only if the indifferent 
buying price of the truncation is positive, i.e. ( ( ), ) 0jb U x w c X   . Refer to the 
definition of value of information in Chapter 1, we know that the value of such 
information on sets, VOI , is defined as 
          
1
max{ [ ( )], ( )} ( ) max{ [ ( )], ( )}j j
n
i
E U w X VOI U w VOI P X E U w U wA X

    . 
Note that max{ [ ( )], ( )}jE U w X c U w c   is strictly decreasing with c  , we 
know that 
1
max{ [ ( )], ( )} ( )j
n
j
i
E U w X c U w c P AX

   is also strictly decreasing with 
c . Since
1
max{ [ ( )], ( )} ( ) max{ [ ( )], ( )}
n
j
i
jAE U w X U w P X E U w X U w

   , we obtain 
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that VOI is unique and positive. Denote  as the accepting set of the lottery after 
acquiring the information at its value, VOI . More precisely,   contains the union of the 
sets , 1,2,...,jA j n such that [ ( )] ( )jE U w X VOI U w VOI    . If [ ( )]jE U w X VOI 
( )U w VOI  for some jA , then the decision maker will be indifferent between accepting 
and rejecting the lottery jX  and   may contain it. If [ ( )]jE U w X VOI   ( )U w VOI
for some jA , then the decision maker will reject jX and   does not contain such jA . I.e.
{ : [ ( )] ( )}j jA E U w X VOI U w VOI      { : [ ( )] (j jA E U w X VOI U w    
)}VOI .  Though we showed that VOI is unique, may not unique. We shall refer back to 
it in section 5.4. Denote 
c as the complement of the accepting set,  .  
 
Figure 5.1. Decision tree after acquiring the information on sets, S. 
Figure 5.1 shows the decision tree after acquiring this information, S, with the cost at its 
value VOI. The expected utility after obtaining the information is 
[ ( ), ] [ ( ), ] [ ( )]cE VOI cU w X X E EU X w X cw U         , (5.1) 
w
w X VOIAccept
Reject
w
w X VOIAccept
Reject
jX A
c
jX A
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where  
,    if 
0,      otherwise.
,X X
X 

 

 
Similar to the discussion in Chapter 3, we consider two cases: 
In particular, if ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X  , then the decision maker feels indifferent 
between accepting and rejecting the lottery without the information. In this case, 
][ ( )E U w X  ( ][ )E U w  and VOI VOIA VOIR  . 
Note that the accepting set,  , depends on not only the utility function of the 
decision maker but also the value of information, VOI . It is hard to compare the value of 
information, VOI , for two decision makers with different utility functions from its 
definition either in (5.2) or in (5.3). Firstly, the accepting sets for two decision makers 
may be different, which lead to two different equations forms for their value of 
information. Secondly, it is hard to determine the accepting set without knowing the 
value of information, VOI , since they are mutually dependent. We now offer a new way 
to find the value of information without using the accepting set,  . The sets in the 
partition, , 1,...,jA j n If [0 ),jA   , can be classified into three different collections: 
i. If ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X  , then the decision maker accepts the lottery without the 
information.  In this case,  ( ) ( )][U w E U w X  and we write VOI VOIA , 
which is given by 
   [ ( )] [ ( )]E U w X VOIA E U w X    .  (5.2) 
ii. If ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X  , then the decision maker rejects the lottery without the 
information. In this case, ( ][ ( )[)]U w E UE w X  and we write VOI VOIR , 
which is given by   
[ ( )] ( )E U w X VOIR U w   .   (5.3) 
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(i) If 0, )[jA   , then the lottery 0jX  and [ ( )] ( ),jE U w X c U w c   
0c  . Any decision maker will accept the lottery after acquiring the 
information at any cost in this case. We denote the collection of such sets 
as a . I.e. [{ : 0, )}ja jA A    
(ii)  If ,0](jA   , then the lottery 0jX  and [ ( )] ( )jE U w X c U w c    , 
0c  .Any decision maker will reject the lottery after acquiring the 
information at any cost in this case. We denote the collection of such sets 
as r . I.e. ({ : ,0]}jr j AA   . 
(iii) If [0 ),jA    and if ,0](jA   , then the lottery jX can be positive or 
negative. The decision maker’s decision depends on his/her utility 
function and the cost of the information after acquiring it. We denote the 
collection of such sets as 0 . I.e. 0 { : }jj a rA A  . 
For example, we consider a partition with some disjoint intervals, 11 , ]( aA   , 
2 1 2( , ]A a a ,…, 1 ( , )n nA a   , where 0 01 10i i na a a a       and 01 1i n   . 
We can straight forward show that 
0 2 1
{ ,..., }a i nA A  , 01{ ,..., }r iA A and 00 1{ }iA  . 
Let K  be the union of all sets in collection a , i.e. 
j aA
jK A  and be the collection 
of the sets which are the union of K  and some sets in the collections 0 . Then the 
accepting set   must be a set in . We again consider the partition with intervals. Direct 
calculation shows that 
0 1
, )[ iK a    and that 0 01[ ,{ ), )[ },i ia a   .  
Theorem 5.1: If ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X  , then max{ }
C
CVOI VOIA VOIA

  , where CVOIA is 
defined as 
   [ ( )] [ ( )]C CE U w X VOIA E U w X    ,  (5.4) 
where ( )CX X I CX  . 
If ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X  , then max{ }
C
CVOI VOIR VOIR

  , where CVOIR is defined as 
   [ ( )] ( )C CE U w X VOIR U w   .   (5.5) 
 104 
 
 Proof: If ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X  , then VOI VOIA is defined in (5.2). Note that 
 , we know that VOI VOIA
 by comparing the equations (5.2) and (5.4),.  It is 
sufficient to show that max{ }
C
CVOIA VOIA

 .  
Denote 1 argmax{ }
C
CC VOIA

. If 1
CVOI VOIA VOIA  , then 
1C   
  1 1
1
[ ( )] [ ( )]
                                 [ ( )]
                                 [ ( )].
C C
C
E U w X VOI E U w X
E U w X VOIA
E U w X VOI
   
  
  
,  (5.6) 
The equalities are due to the definitions in (5.2) and (5.4). From the definitions of  X   
and 1
CX , we obtain that 
  
1
1
1
[ ( )] [ ( )]
[ ( ) ( ), ]
[ ( ) ( ), ]
0
CE U w X VOI E U w X VOI
E U w X VOI U w VOI
E U w VOI U w X VO
C
I C
    
     
    



  (5.7) 
On the other hand, if 1jA C   , then [ ( )] ( )jE U w X VOI U w VOI    . 
Therefore, we obtain that 
  1[ ( ) ( ), ] 0E U w X VOI U w V COI      .  (5.8) 
If 
1
c
jA C   , then [ ( )] ( )jE U w X VOI U w VOI     . Therefore, we know that 
  1[ ( ) ( )], ] 0E U w VOI U w X VOI C     .  (5.9) 
However, (5.8) and (5.9) cannot hold simultaneously due to (5.7). Hence, we obtain that
max{ }
C
CVOI VOIA VOIA

  . 
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We can show that if ( ( ), ) 0b U x w X  , then max{ }C
CVOI VOIR VOIR

   with 
the similar argument.         □ 
Theorem 5.1 offers an alternative definition of value of information, which is 
more useful in developing some theoretical results since the exact accepting set is not 
required. It also reveals an intuition of the value of information. More precisely, 
CX  is 
the decision maker’s net profit after acquiring the information when he/she follows such 
strategy that he/she accepts the lottery if the information indicates that the lottery is in C  
and rejects it otherwise. The original definition of value of information in either (5.2) or 
(5.3) indicates it is measured by the decision maker’s best strategy. However, Theorem 
5.1 indicates that it is also the maximum for the indifferent buying price of the better net 
profit after obtaining the information for the decision maker when he/she follows any 
feasible strategies. We shall refer back to this result in our discussion on the value of 
information on some intervals. 
We consider a particular partition of all possible outcomes of the lottery as the 
intervals with some endpoints 1 2 na a a       . Formally, the partition 
consists of the following intervals 11 , ]( aA   , 2 1 2( , ]A a a ,…, 1 ( , )n nA a   . If there 
exists some {1,2,..., }i n  such that 0ia  , then any decision maker will accept the lottery 
given the information that 1( , ], , 1,...,j j jA a a j i i nX      , where 1na    , since 
the random outcome of the lottery is positive in this case. On the other hand, he/she will 
reject the lottery if knowing that 1( , ], 0,1,...,j j jA a a j iX     , where 0a   . Since 
the decisions after acquiring such information on the lottery are the same as the decisions 
after obtaining the perfect information on the lottery, the value of information on such 
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information is the value of the perfect information, which is discussed in Chapter 2. 
Therefore, we assume that 1,2,0 .. 1, .,i i na     and consider three different cases: 
(i) All endpoints are positive. I.e. 0,ia  1,2,...,i n  .  
(ii) All endpoints are negative. I.e. 0,ia   1,2,...,i n  .  
(iii) Some endpoints are positive and others are negative. I.e. there exists some 
0 {1,..., 1}i n  such that 0 0 10i ia a   . 
Abbas, Bakir, Klutke and Sun proved that if two decision makers both reject the 
lottery without the information on sets, then the less risk averse decision maker values the 
information higher than the more risk averse decision maker. However, they showed that 
if two decision makers accept the lottery without the information, the monotonicity 
between risk aversion and value of imperfect information on sets does not hold when the 
utility functions of the decision makers are not quadratic. We now consider a particular 
partition, which consists of only intervals and shows that if two decision makers accept 
the lottery without the information on intervals, then the more risk averse decision maker 
will value the information higher than the less risk averse decision maker with some 
assumptions.  
Formally, we consider two decision makers A and B with deterministic initial 
wealth levels Aw  and Bw  and utility functions AU  and BU . Without loss of generality, 
we assume that A Bw w w , since we can modify the utility BU  to be 
ˆ ( ) ( )B B B AU x U x w w    by a linear shift on the axis. Let A and B  be the risk aversion 
functions of A  and B (respectively). We also assume that two decision makers A and B 
both accept the lottery without the information on intervals and let AVOIA  and BVOIA be 
the value of information for A  and B in such settings (respectively). We compare such 
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two values of information on the intervals with the endpoints in three different types, 
respectively. 
5.2. Monotonicity of Value of information on Intervals with Positive Endpoints 
We assume that all end points are positive, i.e. 0,ia  1,2,...,i n  . If the 
random outcome of the lottery, X, is in 1( , ]j j jA a a , 2,..., 1j n  , any decision maker 
will accept the lottery, since 1 0X a  . Therefore, the knowledge of jX A ,
2,..., 1j n  is equivalent to the knowledge of 1 1( , )
cX A a    for any decision 
maker. Hence the partition with such intervals can be simplified as the partition with only 
1A  and 1
cA . Figure 5.2 shows the decision trees after acquiring these two equivalent 
information at a cost, c, respectively. 
 
Figure 5.2. (a) The decision tree after acquiring the information on intervals 1 1,..., nA A  ; 
(b) the decision tree after acquiring the information on intervals 1A and 1
cA . 
1
cX A
w c
w X cAccept
Reject
1X A
w c
w X cAccept
Reject
1nX A
w c
w X cAccept
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w c
w X cAccept
Reject
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w c
w X cAccept
Reject
( )a ( )b
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We consider the partition with only two intervals,
1 , ]( aA   and 2 1
cA A  with 
0a   and 0 ( ) 1P X a  without loss of generalization. The direct calculation shows 
that 
0 1{ }A  and that 2{ }a A . Therefore, the collection of possible accepting sets is 
2{ ,( , )}A   . Note that 
( ),X X   , we obtain that ),( 0VOIA    due to its 
definition in (5.4), since the utility function is strictly increasing. Hence, 
2max{0, }AVOIA VOIA , where 2
AVOIA is defined in (5.4). 
Theorem 5.2: Assume that two decision makers A and B both accept a lottery, X, without 
the information and that the partition of the information consists of two intervals with an 
endpoint, a>0.  If ( ) ( ),A Bx x x   , then A BVOIA VOIA . 
The following two lemmas will be useful in the proofs of Theorem 5.2. 
Lemma 5.1: If G is concave and if B is monotonically increasing, then 
[ ( ( )), ] [ ( ( )), ]
( ( )){ [ ( ), ] [ ( ), ]},
E G B w X X E G B w X c X
G B w c E B w X X E B w X c X
 
  
     
        
 (5.10) 
where c is a positive constant and  is any constant. 
Proof: It is well known that the graph of a concave function G  is always below its any 
tangent line. I.e.  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ,( ) ),
y y
x x
G y G x G t dt G x dt G x y x x y        .  (5.11) 
Let ( )B w cx X   and ( )y B w X   in (2.9),  
  
( ( )) ( ( ))
( ( ))[ ( ) ( )].
G B w X G B w X c
G B w X c B w X B w X c
   
      
   (5.12) 
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Since B  is increasing, we know that ( ) ( )B w X c B w c     when X  . 
Since G is concave, we obtain that ( ( )) ( ( ))G B w X c G B w c      . Since 0c  , 
( )B w X  ( )B w X c   and 
( ( ))[ ( ) ( )]
( ( ))[ ( ) ( )].
G B w X c B w X B w X c
G B w c B w X B w X c
      
         (5.13)
 
From (2.10) and(2.11), when X  , we have 
( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ))[ ( ) ( )].G B w X G B w X c G B w c B w X B w X c           (5.14) 
Taking the expectation of X over the interval ( ),   in (2.12), we have   
[ ( ( )), ] [ ( ( )), ]
( ( )){ [ ( ), ] [ ( ), ]}.
E G B w X X E G B w X c X
G B w c E B w X X E B w X c X
 
  
     
          
□
 
 
Lemma 5.2: If G is concave and if B is monotonically increasing with ( ( ))G B w c  
( ( ))G B w c  , then 
  
[ ( ( ))] [ ( ( ))]
( ( )){ [ ( )] [ ( )]},
E G B w X E G B w X c
G B w c E B w X E B w X c


   
     
  (5.15) 
where ( )X X I X     and c is a positive constant. 
Proof: Since G is concave, we take ( )x B w c   and ( )y B w X   in (2.9) and 
obtain 
( ) (( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )) ( )( ).B w X B w c B w c BG G w X B w cG       (5.16) 
Taking the expectation of X  over the interval ( , ] in (2.15), we have  
[ ( ( )), ] [ ( ( )), ]
( ( )){ [ ( ), ] [ ( ), ]}
( ( )){ [ ( ), ] [ ( ), ]}.a
E G B w X X E G B w c X
G B w c E B w X X E B w c X
G B w c E B w X X E B w X c X
 
 
 
    
      
       
 (5.17) 
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The equality in (2.16) is due to that 0aX  when X a . 
From Lemma 5.1 and the fact that aX X when X  , we know 
[ ( ( )), ] [ ( ( )), ]
( ( )){ [ ( ), ] [ ( ), ]}
( ( )){ [ ( ), ] [ ( ), ]}.
E G B w X X E G B w X c X
G B w c E B w X X E B w X c X
G B w c E B w X X E B w X c X



 
  
 
     
        
       
 (5.18) 
The last inequality is due to ( ( )) )( ( )G B w G B wc c   . We obtain (2.14) by 
adding  (2.16) and (2.17).        □ 
Proof of theorem 5.2: Since B  is strictly increasing, we can uniquely define a 
strictly increasing concave function G by ( ) ( ( ))A x G B x  (See Pratt 1964). If 0Aa  , 
then 1[ ( )]E A w X  ( )A w due to proposition 5.1. From Jensen’s inequality, we know that  
1 1 1( [ ( )]) [ ( ( ))] [ ( )] ( ) ( ( ))G E B w X E G B w X E A w X A w G B w       . 
Since G is strictly increasing, we know that 1[ ( )] ( )E B w X B w  and that 0Ba  . 
Since Theorem 5.2 is trivial when 0Ba  , we assume that , 0A Ba a   , then Aa and Ba  
satisfy  
  [ ( )] [ ( )]a AE A w X a E A w X    ,    (5.19) 
and 
  [ ( )] [ ( )]a BE B w X a E B w X    .    (5.20) 
Since G is concave, G is decreasing and ( ( )) )( ( )B Ba aG B w a G B w   . 
Take 0Bc a   in lemma 5.2 and use the definitions of Aa and Ba in (5.19) and (5.20), 
we know that 
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[ ( )] [ ( )]
[ ( )] [ ( )]
[ ( ( ))] [ ( ( ))]
( ( )){ [ ( )] [ ( )]} 0.
a A a B
a B
a B
a B
E A w X a E A w X a
E A w X E A w X a
E G B w X E G B w X a
G B w c E B w X E B w X a
    
    
    
      
 (5.21) 
Since Aa and Ba are constant, A Ba a .      □ 
Comparing to accepting the lottery without the information, the decision maker 
can avoid some uncertain loss when the random outcome of the lottery is below some 
positive level, 1a . Since more risk averse decision maker tends to pay more for the 
uncertain risk, he/she also value such information higher than the less risk averse decision 
maker. The following example illustrates this result. 
Example 5.1: 
Consider a group of decision makers having exponential utility functions, 
( ) xU ex     , with risk aversion coefficients on the interval (0,0.05]  . Suppose they 
all face a lottery X , which is a scaled Beta distributed on the interval [ $60,$80], with 
parameters, 4k  , 4r  , i.e. (4,4, 60,90)X Beta  . Denote ( ( ), )b U x w X as the utility 
indifferent buying price of the lottery X for the decision maker with the utility function, 
( )U x , and initial wealth, w , which is defined as 
   [ ( ( ), ))]( ( )E w X b U x w X wU U    .  (5.22) 
Direct calculation shows that ( ( ), ) 0,b U x w X  (0,0.05]  . Therefore, all 
these decision makers will accept the lottery without any further information. We 
consider the value of information on two intervals, 1 2 ]( , 0A   and 2 20( , )A   with a 
positive endpoint 20. 
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Figure 5.3 (a) plots the preference indifferent buying price versus the risk 
aversion coefficient,  , and indicates that it is above zero. Moreover, it is monotonically 
decreasing with  , since the risk aversion function is monotonically increasing with 
and more risk averse decision maker has lower preference buying price. Theorem 5.2 
shows that more risk averse decision maker value the information on such intervals 
higher than less risk averse decision maker when they both accept the lottery without the 
information. Since the risk averse function is monotonically increasing with  , the value 
of information on such intervals is monotonically increasing with  as well in such 
region. Figure 5.3 (b) indeed shows such case.  
 
Figure 5.3. (a) ( ( ), ) 0,b U x w X  (0,0.05]  ; (b) value of information increases with 
 . 
5.3. Monotonicity of Value of information on Intervals with Negative Endpoints 
Now we assume that all endpoints are negative, i.e. 0,ia   1,2,...,i n  . Given 
the knowledge that the lottery is in some negative interval, 1( , ], {1,..., }j j jA a a j n  , 
any decision maker will reject the lottery since it brings about some uncertain loss, i.e. 
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0jX a  . This information is equivalent to the information on 1 , )[nA b     and its 
complement, 1 ( ],
c
nA b    , where 0nb a   . We assume 1n  and 
0 ( ) 1P X b     without loss of generality. Since the decision maker accepts the lottery 
without the information, he/she will accept the lottery given the knowledge that it is in
2 , )(A b  . Otherwise, the decision maker will reject the lottery after acquiring the 
information whatever it is since he/she rejects the lottery when it is in 1 , ]( bA    as 
well. However, such decision is even worse than the decision without the information, 
which is impossible.  Figure 5.4 shows the decision tree with such information having its 
cost, c. 
 
Figure 5.4. The decision tree with the information on the intervals ( , )b  and ( ),b  . 
Since ( ) 0P X b   , the decision maker will avoid some uncertain loss with 
such strictly positive probability when the random outcome of the lottery is below b . 
w c
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Therefore the value of information on such intervals is always nonzero, which is different 
from the case in section 5.2. Formally, the value of information, VOIA , is defined as  
  [ ( )] [ ( )]bE U w X VOIA E U w X    ,   (5.23) 
where ( )bX X I X b     . 
Theorem 5.3 Assume that two decision makers A and B both accept a lottery, X, without 
the information and that the partition consists of two intervals with an endpoint, 0b  . 
If ( ) ( ),A Bx x x    and ( ) ( ), [ , ]A B B Bx x x w b VOIA w VOIA       , then AVOIA 
BVOIA .  
Proof: Since ( ) ( ), [ , ]A B B Bx x x w b a w a       , we know that ( ) ( )A x kB x
d , [ ,Bx w b a    ]Bw a , where k and b are constant. Hence ( ) ,G t kt d  t  
[ ( ), ( )]B BB w b a B w a    and )( ( ) ( ( 0))B BG B w b G aB w ka     . Take Bc a  
in lemma 5.2, we know that 
 
[ ( )] [ ( )]
[ ( )] [ ( )]
[ ( ( ))] [ ( ( ))]
( ( )){ [ ( )] [ ( )]} 0.
b A b B
b B
b B
B b B
E A w X a E A w X a
E A w X E A w X a
E G B w X E G B w X a
G B w a E B w X E B w X a
 



    
    
    
      
  (5.24) 
The equalities in (5.24) are due to the definitions of the value of information, Aa
and Ba , and the function G . Since Aa and Ba are constant, A Ba a .  □ 
The condition in Theorem 5.3, ( ) ( ), [ , ]A B B Bx x x w b VOIA w VOIA       , 
means that ( ) ( )A BU x kU x b  , [ , ]B Bx w b VOIA w VOIA     , where k and b are 
constant. In other words, two decision makers share equivalent utility function in such 
interval.  However, if 0b  , then the information is perfect and the above interval 
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contains only one point and the condition holds for any utility functions. Therefore, no 
such condition is needed in the perfect information case. Moreover, this condition is 
sufficient but not necessary. Our proof shows that the risk aversion of two decision 
makers over the interval [ , ]B Bw b VOIA w VOIA    effects the value of information 
minor to their risk aversion in the whole domain. In addition, such condition almost holds 
when b is small. Therefore if two decision makers both accept the lottery without the 
infroamtion, then the more risk averse decision maker will value such information higher 
than the less risk averse decision maker even without this condition. The following 
example illustrates this result. 
Example 5.2: 
We again consider the same group of decision makers and the lottery in example 
5.1. However, the information is based on another two intervals 1 2 ]( , 0A    and 
2 20( , )A    with a negative endpoint 20 .  
 
Figure 5.5. Value of information increases with   
Theorem 5.3 shows that the more risk averse decision maker values the 
information on such intervals higher than the less risk averse decision maker when they 
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both accept the lottery without the information and share the same risk aversion in a 
particular interval. However, we mentioned that the condition on risk aversion is 
negligible when the endpoint is close to zero. Though the exponential utility function 
class does not hold this condition, the value of information in our settings is indeed 
monotonically increasing. This is the case shown in Figure 5.5. 
5.4. Monotonicity of Value of Information on Intervals 
Now we consider the last but the most general case: some end points are positive 
and the others are negative. More precisely, there exists 0 {1,2,..., 1}i n  such that 
0 0 1
0i ia a   . Given the knowledge that the lottery, 0, 1jA jX i   , any decision maker 
will reject the lottery with such information, since the random outcome of the lottery is 
negative, i.e. 0iX a  , in such settings. On the other hand, any decision maker will 
accept the lottery given the knowledge that the lottery, 0, 1jA jX i   . Therefore, we 
can assume such partition only contains two end points, 
0i
b a  and 
0 1i
a a   and 
0 ( ), ( ), ( ) 1P X b P b X a P X a        without any loss of generality. We consider 
two cases: 
(i) If the decision maker rejects the lottery when its random outcome is in
( , ]b a , then the decision tree with such information is the same as the 
decision tree with all positive endpoints in section 5.2. The value of 
information, 
1VOIA VOIA , which is the nonzero value of information on 
the intervals with one positive endpoint, a , and satisfies  
     1[ ( )] [ ( )]aE U w X VOIA E U w X    .  (5.25) 
(ii) If the decision maker accepts the lottery when its random outcome is in
( , ]b a , then the decision tree with such information is the same as the 
decision tree with all negative endpoints in section 5.3. The value of 
 117 
 
information, 
2VOIA VOIA , which is the value of information on the 
intervals with one negative endpoint, b , and satisfies 
     2[ ( )] [ ( )]bE U w X VOIA E U w X    .  (5.26) 
Moreover, Theorem 5.1 indicates that 1 2max{ , }VOIA VOIA VOIA Figure 5.6 
shows the decision trees with different decisions after acquiring the information at its cost, 
c and the decision trees with their equivalent information, respectively.       
 
 
Figure 5.6. (A1) the decision tree for rejecting given ( , ]X b a  ; (A2) the decision tree 
after acquiring the information on ( , ]b   and ( , )b  ; (B1) the decision tree for 
accepting given ( , ]X b a  ; (B2) the decision tree after acquiring the information on 
( , ]a  and ( , )a  . 
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Theorem 5.4 Assume that two decision makers A and B both accept a lottery, X, without 
the information and that the partition of the information consists of three intervals with 
two endpoints, 0b a   . If ( ) ( ),A Bx x x    and ( ) ( ), [ ,A B Bx x x w b VOIA     
]Bw VOIA , then AVOIA  BVOIA .  
Proof: Denote 1,Aa  and 1,Ba  as the value of information defined in (5.25) for the 
decision makers A and B . Denote 2,Aa  and 2,Ba  as the value of information defined in 
(5.26) for decision makers A and B . Then 1, 2,max{ , }A A Aa a a  and 1, 2,max{ , }B B Ba a a . 
Since ( ) ( ),A Bx x x   , we know that 1, 1,A Ba a  from Theorem 5.2. If 1, 2,B Ba a , then 
1, 1, 2,max{ , }A A B B Ba a a a a   . Otherwise, 2, 1,B B Ba a a   and ( ) ( ),A Bx x  [x w  
2, 2,, ]B Bb a w a  . Applying Theorem 5.3, we obtain that 2, 2,A A B Ba a a a   .  □ 
Similar to the information on the intervals with all negative endpoints, more risk 
averse decision maker value the information higher then less risk averse decision maker 
without the identical risk aversion on particular interval, if the negative endpoints b  is 
close to zero. The following example shows the results. 
Example 5.3: 
We again consider the same group of decision makers and the lottery in example 
5.1. The information on interval is based on a partition with two endpoints 20 and 20 .  
Theorem 5.4 predicts that the value of information on such intervals is 
monotonically increasing with  , since the risk aversion function is monotonically 
increasing with  . This is indeed the case shown in Figure 5.7 as the solid line.  
Moreover, the line with dashes indicates the value of information on two intervals with a 
positive endpoint 20, i.e. 1VOIA , which is identical to the line shown in Figure 5.3 (b). 
The line with dots plots the value of information on two intervals with a negative 
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endpoint -20, i.e. 
2VOIA , which is identical to the line shown in Figure 5.5. Theorem 5.1 
predicts
1 2max{ , }VOIA VOIA VOIA  . The three lines in Figure 5.7 show the exact 
situation. Moreover, the critical risk aversion coefficient 0.03495c  , with which the 
decision maker feels indifferent between accepting and rejecting the lottery when 
knowing the lottery is in 
2 ( , ]A b a  , 2X , and the cost of the information is its value, 
5.9846CVOIA  . If 0 c   , then the decision maker will accept 2X  when the cost of 
information is its value, 2VOIA VOIA . If 0.05c   , then the decision maker will 
reject 
2X  when the cost of information is its value, 1VOIA VOIA . 
 
Figure 5.7. 1 2max{ , }VOIA VOIA VOIA is monotonically increasing with  . 
5.5. Summary 
We extend the information in the two-action decision problem to be imperfect, 
which indicates the lottery is in one of the sets given by a particular partition. We show 
that the value of information is defined either as the indifferent buying price of the best 
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improvement of the alternatives or the maximal indifferent buying price of all possible 
improvement of the alternative after acquiring the information. More precisely, if the 
information indicates the set containing the random outcome of the lottery in some 
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive sets,
1,..., nA A , then the value of 
information is the indifferent buying price of the improvement from the information with 
the optimal decision after acquiring the information, which is defined as 
1
max{ [ ( )], ( )} ( ) max{ [ ( )], ( )}j j
n
i
E U w X VOI U w VOI P X E U w U wA X

    . 
On the other hand, we define a class of sets as the collection of all possible 
accepting sets for any decision maker. Formally, we classify the sets , 1,...,iA i n into 
three disjoint groups, [{ : 0, )}ja jA A   , ({ : ,0]}jr j AA    and 0 { :jA
}aj rA  . More precisely, a  is a group of all sets such that any decision maker will 
accept the lottery given the knowledge that the lottery is in it. Conversely, r  is a group 
of all sets such that any decision maker will reject the lottery given the knowledge that 
the lottery is in it. Finally, 0  is a group of all sets such that some decision makers will 
accept the lottery and others will reject it given the knowledge that the lottery is in it. 
Then is the collection of the sets which are the union of K  and some sets in the 
collections 0 , where
j aA
jK A . Note that any decision maker will accept the lottery 
after acquiring the information only when the lottery is in a set in . Two information 
on sets, 1S  and 2S  are equivalent for any decision maker and any lottery if and only if 
1 2 , where 1  and 2  are the collection of all possible accepting sets for 
information 1S  and 2S , respectively. We show that the value of information is the 
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maximal indifferent buying price of the improvement from the information with any 
feasible decision after acquiring the information. (See Theorem 5.1) 
 Abbas et al (submitted) proved that if two decision makers both reject the lottery 
without the information on sets, then the less risk averse decision maker values the 
information higher than the more risk averse decision maker. However, they showed that 
if two decision makers accept the lottery without the information, then the monotonicity 
between risk aversion and value of imperfect information on sets does not hold when the 
utility functions of the decision makers are not quadratic. We consider the partition 
whose sets are all intervals and explore the monotonicity between risk aversion and value 
of information on intervals over the accept region. Fomally, the information is generated 
by intervals 
11 , ]( aA   , 2 1 2( , ]A a a ,…, 1( , ]n n nA a a , 1 ( , )n nA a   . If all endpoints, 
, 1,...,ia i  n , are positive, then such information is equivalent to the information on two 
intervals with one positive endpoint, min{ 0 : 1,..., }ia a i n   . We show that the more 
risk averse decision maker will value the information on such intervals higher than the 
less risk averse decision maker when they both accept the lottery without the information. 
(See Theorem 5.2)  
Conversely, if all endpoints, , 1,...,ia i  n , are negative, then such information is 
equivalent to the information on two intervals with one negative endpoint, max{ ib a  
0 : 1,..., }i n . We show that if two decision makers both accept the lottery without the 
information, then the more risk averse decision maker will value the information on such 
intervals higher than the less risk averse decision maker when their risk aversion are 
identical in a particular interval. (See Theorem 5.3) 
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Finally, if some of the endpoints , 1,...,ia i  n , are positive and some are negative, 
then such information is equivalent to the information on three intervals with a negative 
endpoint, max{ ib a   0 : 1,..., }i n  and a positive endpoint, min{ 0 : 1,..., }ia a i n   . 
We show the same monotonicity under the same assumption in the all negative endpoints 
case. (See Theorem 5.4)  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Value of information is a measure of the improvement from obtaining the extra 
information before decisions. The risk aversion function is particularly used to identify 
the risk attitude of the decision maker. To describe the effects of risk aversion on value of 
information plays an important role in decision analysis in decades. Examples were posed 
to show that there is no global monotonicity between risk aversion and value of 
information in many decision problems, though the more risk averse decision maker 
should be willing to pay more for the extra information, which always reduce the 
uncertainty of all alternatives.  
We prove the monotonicity between risk aversion and value of perfect 
information given the knowledge of the decision maker’s optimal decision without the 
information in the two-action decision problems. More precisely, we consider the 
decision makers deciding whether or not buying a lottery can obtain the perfect 
information on the lottery. If two decision makers accept the lottery without the 
information, then the more risk averse decision maker will value the perfect information 
higher than the less risk averse decision maker. However, if two decision makers reject 
the lottery without the information, then the less risk averse decision maker will value the 
perfect information higher than the more risk averse decision maker. Note that the more 
risk averse decision maker has less preference to the lottery without the information than 
the less risk averse decision maker. The decision maker who feels indifferent between 
accepting and rejecting the lottery without the information will value the perfect 
information higher than any more risk averse or less risk averse decision maker.  
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We also show that the monotonicity between risk aversion and value of perfect 
information in the two-action decision problem needs different measures of risk aversion 
under different assumptions on the initial wealth. Formally, we prove that if the initial 
wealth is deterministic, then the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion is the mildest one 
to guarantee that the monotonicity between the risk aversion and value of information 
hold for any lottery and any initial wealth level. However, if the initial wealth is uncertain 
but independent of the lottery, then an example is posed to show that the more risk averse 
decision maker may value the perfect information even lower than the less risk averse 
decision maker when they both accept it without the information. The Rubinstein’s 
measure of risk aversion is proved to be the weakest one that offers the monotonicity for 
any lottery and any independent initial wealth. Conversely, examples show that the 
Rubinstein’s measure of risk aversion is not sufficient for the monotonicity if the 
independence between the initial wealth and the lottery is missing. For example, if the 
uncertain initial wealth is merely irrelevant to the expectation of the positive and negative 
parts of the lottery, then a stronger measure, the Ross’s measure of risk aversion is 
necessary for the monotonicity.  
Note that the monotonicity between risk aversion and the value of perfect 
information varies with different original decisions without the information. The 
improvement in the lottery also affects the monotonicity between risk aversion and the 
value of perfect information, since the original decisions without the information depend 
on the lottery. In particular, assume that a risk seeking or risk neural decision maker 
values the perfect information on a lottery the same as a more risk averse decision maker 
and consider the decision makers is facing a new lottery. We show that if the new lottery 
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first order stochastically dominates the original lottery, then the more risk averse decision 
maker will value the perfect information on the new lottery higher than the less risk 
averse decision maker. Conversely, the less risk averse decision maker will value the 
perfect information on the new lottery higher than the more risk averse decision maker if 
the original lottery first order stochastically dominates it.  
Note that the perfect information is hard to achieve in practice, we consider the 
information on some mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive set. Formally, the 
decision maker can only identify the set in a particular partition which will contain the 
net profit of the lottery from the information. Abbas, BakIr, Klutke and Sun showed that 
if two decision makers both reject the lottery without the information, then the less risk 
averse decision maker will value the information higher than the higher risk averse 
decision maker. However, if two decision makers both reject the lottery without the 
information, then monotonicity between risk aversion and the value of imperfect 
information holds only when the utility functions of the decision makers are quadratic. 
However, we showed that such monotonicity also holds when the partition consists of  
intervals under some assumptions. Formally, if all endpoints of the intervals are positive, 
then the more risk averse decision maker will value the information on intervals higher 
than the less risk averse decision maker. If  the risk aversion functions of two decision 
makers are identity in a neighborhood of their initial wealth, which is related to  the 
greatest negative endpoint, then the more risk averse decision maker will value the 
information on intervals higher than the less risk averse decision maker when they both 
accept the lottery without the information. 
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Our discussion on the effects of risk aversion on the value of information in two-
action decision problems with different settings leads to several directions for future 
research. As we mentioned in the summary of chapter 3, the two-action decision problem 
with two risky lotteries also exhibits the monotonicity between risk aversion and value of 
information. However, the assumptions on the dependent structure of two lotteries in 
chapter 3 are unusual in practice. The research under some milder assumptions but for 
some particular lotteries may reveal some intuition between risk aversion and value of 
information. Moreover, the multi-atction decision problems, where decision makers are 
facing multiple lotteries are extensions of two-action decision problems, the effects of 
risk aversion on value of information are not only theoretically interesting but also widely 
applied in practical. We believe that the future research on multi-action decision 
problems will reveal the intuition of risk aversion and the effects of information in 
decision problems.  
Moreover, the two-action decision problems are sigle stage decision problem. 
Some research revealed the effects of information in multi-stage problems (see Philippe 
Bontems and Alban Thomas 2000, Mathew Jackson 1991, Ilan Kremer 2002). The possible 
future research will exhibit the effect of risk aversion on the value of private information 
in some general settings.  
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